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MYTHBUSTING PARK CHUNG HEE:  
A REEXAMINATION OF PARK AND HIS COUP 
 
 
An Abstract of the Thesis by  
Justin W. Malzac 
 
 
Park Chung-Hee is a divisive figure. For some he is a saint that rescued his country 
from the brink of collapse and helped it rise into modernity. For others he is a devil, an 
iron-fisted dictator who cared more about his own power than his people. Both of these 
are politically slanted myths promoted as part of a corresponding political agenda. But 
even politically neutral writings on Park unwittingly conduct a mythmaking of their own. 
This paper is an attempt to show that Park Chung-Hee has become a mythological figure 
in Korean history because the scope of his power, agency and historical relevance is vastly 
overstated in the conventional narrative. Often historical analyses and narratives focus on 
Park Chung-Hee to the virtual exclusion of all other contemporary and relevant agents. By 
examining various primary sources, this paper attempts to highlight where arguments 
about Park’s historical agency, often presented with certainty, are in fact far from clear 
and absolute facts. This paper argues that, at least early on in his time in power, Park 
Chung-Hee as a historical agent could be much less important than we imagine, and that 
there were several other actors of note who wielded significant power at the same time. 
 
iv 
NOTE ON ROMANIZATIONS 
 
 
For Korean names and terms this paper will utilize the Revised Romanization of 
Korean system, which was made the official system of the Republic of Korea government 
by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in 2000. Because of its official nature, 
this is the most widely-used system today for the Romanization of Korean outside of 
academic writing. Korean words and place names will be rendered using the Revised 
system. For the sake of clarity, the names of persons will be rendered in the most 
common form in which they appear in the primary record, but the Revised system 
Romanization will be provided in parentheses when the name first appears in each 
chapter. Any quotes from sources containing Korean names will be modified to the 
common rendering of the name in question. Additionally, it is important to note that 
Korean names are commonly written surname first, usually with a two-syllable given 
name following. For the sake of clarity, all Korean names will be written in this manner, 
with the given name hyphenated. An exception to this rule is for scholars who choose to 
write their names in the Western style. An example of all this being put into practice 
would look as follows: Park Chung-Hee (Bak Cheong-Hui). If no adjustment 
accompanies the first appearance of a name, that name is already Romanized following 
this system. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: A QUESTION OF AGENCY 
 
 
In 2013, Park Geun-Hye (Bak Geun-Hye) became the first woman president of 
South Korea. She is a conservative, following in the footsteps of fellow party member 
and conservative Lee Myung-Bak (I Myeong-Bak). Hers marks the second conservative 
administration after a brief and powerful liberal surge in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
But perhaps most important in the eyes of the public today, she is the daughter of former 
authoritarian president Park Chung-Hee. Since Park Geun-Hye’s election, it has been 
nearly impossible to read about her without any reference to her father. As her 
administration becomes more strong-armed and hawkish, as it continues to use 
oppressive measures against the opposition, comparisons with her father’s rule become 
more relevant and more commonplace. It has also created a resurgence of interest in the 
history of the era when Park Chung-Hee ruled the country. However the historiography 
has yet to fully catch up with modern standards and theory, or to update itself with fresh 
perspectives. The literature published in English is especially delayed in this regard.  
This paper is an attempt to reexamine a portion of the so-called “Park era,” 
specifically the coup and junta period between 1960 and 1963. On May 16, 1961, Park 
Chung-Hee, a Major General in the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, participated in a 
2  
coup against the recently created parliamentary government of Prime Minister Chang 
Myon (Chang Myeon aka John M. Chang). The Chang government rose up after the 
resignation of President Rhee Syngman (I Seung-Man) and dissolution of the latter’s 
government. The Chang regime was in power for less than a year before being dissolved 
itself. After toppling the Chang government, a military junta was established and ruled 
until late 1963, when open elections were held and Park was elected president of the 
ROK under a new president-centered constitution. Park stayed in power until he was 
assassinated in October of 1979.  
The “Park era” is arguably one of the most important periods in modern Korean 
history. The government during this period instituted changes that raised the country up 
from poverty. Korea had been one of the poorest countries in the world, but in a matter of 
decades it became a trade and economic giant.1 The 1970s also saw the empowerment of 
the democracy movement in opposition to increases in the Park government’s 
authoritarianism. Most aspects of political and economic life in the ROK today can be 
traced back to this period, whether it be the explosive democratic politics, the strong 
trade-centered economy, the near invulnerable status of the chaebol (super 
conglomerates), or the increasing division between the rich and poor. Byung-Kook Kim 
(Gim Byeong-Guk) writes “few periods have changed South Korean history more than 
the Park era . . . And after the Park era suddenly ended in 1979, the reactions to what had 
                                                          
1 In an interview from 1995 Richard A. Ericson Jr., a former American diplomat,  he noted “when I first 
came there in 1945, it was the middle ages and in 1965 in was somewhat better. When I came back and left 
in 1976, Korea was virtually a modern nation. There were making wooden boats in 1945 and from 250 to 
300 thousand ton tankers in 1976. This took some doing and President Park is responsible, I think, for a 
very, very great part of the success” (Ambassador Richard A. Ericson, Jr., Interviewed by Charles Stuart 
Kennedy, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 1998). 
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taken place transformed the country once more.”2 It is now increasingly relevant and 
important to understand this part of Korea’s past.  
 
A Question of Agency 
 
 
 
The literature on Park Chung-Hee suffers from several related problems. Park 
historiography, at least in English, seems to have failed to bring in many of the new ideas 
and strategies from the discussions of historical theory that have been ongoing since at 
least the 1960s. Historical paradigms—Marxism and New Social History, which 
promoted the importance of regular people as subjects in historical analysis; New 
Historicism, which suggested that historians cannot remove themselves from their 
modern context and its effect on their analysis; or Post Modernism, which in part has 
pushed away from the “grand narrative” of traditional history and the centering of 
narratives around specific agents—have not been effectively applied to “Park era” 
history. 
Additionally, the literature on Park Chung-Hee available in English is relatively 
scarce, particularly in dealing with the coup and junta period. The majority of journal 
papers focus on economics or industrialization, rather than the early power politics. The 
biggest English collection released to date3, The Park Chung Hee Era, is largely a 
                                                          
2 Kim, Byung-Kook, “The Case for Political History,” The Park Chung Hee Era [Kindle Edition], Byung-
kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, eds (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2011): Locations 21-24. 
3 There are three major releases on the “Park era,” all in the form of essay collections. The largest, at 744 
pages, is Byung-Kook Kim’s The Park Chung Hee Era. Additionally, there are Byeong-Cheon Lee’s 
Developmental Dictatorship and The Park Chung-Hee Era, which is 384 pages, and Hyung-A Kim and 
Clark W. Sorensen’s Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961-1979, which is 350 pages. Byung-Kook 
Kim’s work provides the most detailed and comprehensive discussion of the entirety of the “Park era”, 
dealing with most issues, including the coup, the military, industrialization and foreign relations. The last 
section of the book even contains comparative studies with authoritarianism in other countries. The book is 
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traditional history. At least in reference to the English literature, the work does little to 
distinguish itself, nor does it amount to much of a revision. The authors of the various 
essays in the collection provide mostly minor reinterpretations of the same arguments and 
the same narrative that has been popular for decades. They rely overwhelmingly on 
secondary sources, and rehash the conventional narrative more often than they provide 
new primary research. This is a trend in the other collections as well. The work is 
essentially a traditional or national history, in that the narrative is strongly centered on a 
modern or current Korean viewpoint, and it focuses on a mythological figure, Park 
Chung-Hee. This paper argues that the literature is mythological because historians of 
Park Chung-Hee often attribute too much to this one man and his agency. They seem to 
suggest, if perhaps unintentionally, that most progress during the period, good or bad, 
stemmed from Park’s power and agency.  
If Marxism and Post Modernism have added anything beneficial to the historical 
debate, it is to deemphasize the role of individuals and the power of individual agency in 
favor of structural or systematic explanations. For example, in regards to industrialization 
the focus still lies on what decisions or policies Park made as president, and it is assumed 
that he was the sole individual responsible for these acts. Less work has been done on the 
attitudes of workers who pushed through the industrialization period despite harsh 
conditions, or on the government as a coalition of individuals who had to negotiate in 
order for each policy to be developed and put in action. Park wielded a lot of power as 
president, perhaps more than most leaders, but it is foolish to suggest that he was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
by far the best source available in English on Park Chung-Hee and his government. However, the 
individual essays are conventional and seem to represent reproductions of the long-standing narrative, 
rather than new research or new perspectives. 
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responsible for every idea or every decision. In fact, the historical record contains 
numerous episodes where this was not the case, and these are just the ones in the public 
discourse.  
This leads to a pressing issue with Park historiography, which is the analysis, or 
rather lack thereof, of Park’s agency. This is why this paper puts the term “Park era” in 
quotation marks. The period was certainly much more than the story of a single man; the 
events that transpired were caused by a multitude of interconnected agents. Here the word 
“agent” is used to describe those historical actors who had the capacity to affect the 
course of events, examples being government officials who created or approved policies, 
faction leaders who engaged in power struggles and others who decisions affected events 
in some significant way. Understanding the limits of Park Chung-Hee’s agency is 
important for getting at the truth of the time.  
Byung-Kook Kim asks “To what degree was Park Chung-Hee personally 
responsible for the transformation—both political and economic—across multiple 
sectors?” 4 Yet the authors in his book do little to truly examine, with clear evidence, the 
depth and limits of Park’s agency and responsibility. Furthermore, they rarely support 
specific descriptions of Park’s thoughts or actions with evidence from the primary record. 
The other collections are often similar in their lack of evidence supporting absolute 
declarations of Park’s agency. Park’s agency seems taken for granted rather than a 
revelation of the research.  
Regarding agency in historical narratives, David Gary Shaw argued that “the 
agent remains common and prominent in much historical work. If not for the important 
                                                          
4 Ibid., locations 26-27. 
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business—shared by radical, liberal, and conservative historiography—of assigning 
blame . . . the responsibilities and relevance that cling to agency might have disappeared 
long ago.”5 Blame seems to be one of the key functions of Park historiography, either as 
praise for industrialization and economic progress, or condemnation for human rights 
abuses and environmental destruction. Seungsook Moon (Mun Seung-Suk), in her study 
on Park literature and collective memory, argued “The recollective representations of 
Park in these popular texts can be categorized into three distinct types: glorification, 
demonization, and humanization.”6 For most of the post-Park era, glorification or 
demonization has been the norm. Only recently have works begun to accept the limits 
and contradictions inherent in a human agent. What the three different forms share, 
though, is an over-emphasis of Park’s role in historic events during the period he was 
president.  
For many discussions of the “Park era,” Park Chung-Hee is the only agent that 
matters. For example, Young Jak Kim (Gim Yeong-Jak) suggested that Park “should be 
only partly defended in the case of the authoritarian Yusin system, because he carried his 
defection from liberal democracy and restriction of small freedoms too far and attempted 
to create a permanent presidency through a constitutional amendment. The blame for this 
should be placed, of course, mainly on Park himself.”7 Although his essay is heavily 
weighted in support of Park, here he clearly isolates Park as a lone agent, citing “his 
                                                          
5 Shaw, David Gary, “Happy in Our Chains? Agency and Language in the Postmodern Age,” History and 
Theory 40, No. 4 (Dec 2001): 3. 
6 Moon, Seungsook.“The Cultural Politics of Remembering Park Chung Hee,” The Asia Pacific  
Journal 7, No. 5 (May 2009): 3. 
7 Kim, Young Jak, “Park Chung Hee’s Governing Ideas: Impact on National Consciousness and Identity,” 
Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961-1979 [Kindle Edition], Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen, 
eds (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2011): 95. 
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defection” from democracy, leaving little space for the influence or plans of others. How 
others may have acted towards, encouraged, or benefitted from, the adoption of the Yusin 
system is ignored here, as in most of the literature. The only thing that matters is how 
Yusin benefitted Park, and accordingly the conclusion is drawn that the Yusin system was 
put in place solely to keep Park in power. In doing so, authors like Kim miss important 
details such as the fact that the Yusin Constitution was drafted by a state council and 
voted into law by a public referendum.8  
Not only were other groups such as the state council and public involved in the 
process of adopting the Yusin Constitution, other agents seem to have played key roles. In 
an interview with 2001 Donald Gregg, a CIA chief in Korea at the time, he suggested that 
Lee Hu-Rak (I Hu-Rak) was mostly responsible for the adoption of Yusin. Lee was the 
boss of the Korean CIA (KCIA) at the time and had visited North Korea for secret 
meetings with the leaders there. Gregg argued that he “always thought that the roots of 
Yusin came from his interpretation, Lee Hu-Rak’s interpretation of what he had seen in 
Pyongyang. And he said to President Park ‘If we are going to open up a dialogue with 
them, we have to be as strongly in control in South Korea as he is in North Korea.’ And I 
think that led to Yusin.”9 One should not simply reject such accounts because the witness 
is American. Several diplomats have noted that the American CIA in Korea at the time 
was quite knowledgeable.10 It is certainly not any worse than looking for the facts in Lee 
Hu-Rak’s own memoirs, a major source cited by the authors in The Park Chung Hee Era, 
without any assessment of the source’s reliability. If either of these men had motive to 
                                                          
 
9 Kwon, Tae-ho, “Former Ambassador Donald Gregg Discusses Park Chung-Hee’s Legacy,” The Hankoreh, 
May 13, 2011. 
10 See the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project interviews with Marshall Green and Richard A. Ericson Jr., 
amongst others. 
8  
bend the truth regarding the responsibility for domestic ROK policies, it would be Lee.11 
Attributing events like these solely to Park is too simplistic of an explanation. It is easy to 
argue that Park was a power-monger who would do anything to keep his power. But this 
ignores both the agency of other members of the ruling collective who had real and 
significant reasons to keep Park in power for their own sakes, and also the contrary 
narratives presented in other sources. 
Perhaps one of the best examples of  mythologically overemphasizing Park’s 
agency and responsibility is Hyug-Baeg Im’s (Im Hyeong-Baek) description of the 
passage of the 1969 constitutional amendment that let Park run for a third term. Im writes 
“The first political leader to bring up the issue of constitutional revision publicly was 
acting DRP chairman Yun Chi-Yong of the anti-mainstream faction. . . . [He] called for a 
constitutional revision to clear the way for a third term for Park . . . Park maintained a 
low profile on the issue of constitutional revision until he thought his proxies had 
succeeded in establishing the subject's legitimacy.”12 Though Im notes that other 
politicians called for the action, the author describes them as “proxies,” meaning they 
lacked their own agency. They were completely bound to Park’s will. The author 
provides no sources for any part of the above statement, nor any citations or evidence 
elsewhere to prove he has a clear idea what Park’s thoughts were at the time. There is, in 
fact, evidence suggesting the opposite to be true, that Park was resistant to the idea. Such 
                                                          
11 Gregg lays the responsibility for the brutality of the KCIA in the early 70s, including the kidnapping of 
Kim Dae-Jung and torture of an American professor, clearly at the feet of Lee Hu-Rak, and even suggests 
Lee was responsible for the authoritarian shift of the government in the 70s. Moreover, Park and Lee had a 
falling out that they never recovered from. Lee Hu-Rak would certainly be motivated to distance himself 
from the Park government and his role in it. 
12  Im, Hyug Baeg, “The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled,” The Park Chung Hee Era, 
Locations 3358-3361 
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evidence might be weak, and the conclusions drawn from it flawed, but its existence 
should be acknowledged and its commentary refuted, not ignored. Such ambiguity makes 
it doubly important to support any claims with clear evidence.  
It is plausible that Yun Chi-Yong and others personally wanted Park to stay on as 
President and leader of their party because there was no other strong personality to rally 
behind and because their opposition was getting stronger. There is no requirement that 
they must be manipulated to think so. Studies on Korean party politics have shown that 
political parties in South Korea tend to shatter when they lose their patrons.13 Research 
conducted at the time of these events showed that public support for Park remained high 
even as support for his government and party fell.14 Im’s chosen title for his essay, 
“Machiavelli Revealed,” only highlights the excessive focus on, and bias against, Park as 
the agent: the action taker, the ego-maniac, manipulating everything for his own benefit. 
Branding Park as Machiavelli separates him from the ruling collective, makes him more 
important than any other historical actor, if not exclusively so. And the very invocation of 
the name Machiavelli, including quotes from the Machiavellian texts, imposes a blatantly 
negative and mythological tone on the entire essay, and implies Park was specifically 
worse than any other politician or leader in Korea.  
Perez Zagorin, in his examination of post modernism’s relation to historiography, 
acknowledges that “the overt ideological and political biases that tend to direct or 
                                                          
13 For an examination of party politics in Korea see Steinberg and Shin, “Tensions in South Korean 
Political Parties in Transition: From Entourage to Ideology?” Asian Survey 46, No. 4 (Jul/Aug 2006): 517-
537. 
14 For further details, see Kim C.I. Eugene, “Korea at the Crossroads: The Birth of the Fourth Republic,” 
Pacific Affairs 46, No. 2 (Summer 1973): 218-231. 
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influence work in certain fields of history” are a problem.15 Perez also quotes Roger 
Chartier, who argued that historians must fight against “mythical reconstructions of the 
past governed by the needs of communities, imagined or real, national or not, that create 
or accept historical narratives to suit their desires and expectations.” These are certainly 
not imagined problems. The mythology of Park has perhaps become even more distant 
from the truth as new writing relies more and more heavily on secondary research, 
regurgitating the same narrative, lightly-shaded to serve new agendas, under the guise of 
reinterpretation. Is it no surprise then that new interviews with Kim Jong-Pil (Gim Jong-
Pil), co-conspirator of Park, in which he declared that he was the true architect and 
planner of the coup, seem to have gone largely unnoticed by the public?  
Little work has been done to truly tease out the actions and events that can 
accurately be ascribed to Park and his individual agency. Most authors take one of two 
simplified approaches: either they describe everything as being caused by Park, e.g. 
“Park did this” and “Park decided that,” or they use some kind of generalized phrase 
denoting the ruling elites such as “Korean authorities”, thus sidestepping the issue of 
agency and responsibility all together. In the former case, by presuming that Park was 
fundamentally responsible for most key events, the influence of other historical agents is 
obscured. For example, the behavior of the KCIA is often attributed to Park and his 
political objectives of the time. However, Donald Gregg argued that the behavior of the 
KCIA was more directly related to whoever was the boss at the time, rather than the 
contemporary politics. Gregg noted that the brutality of the KCIA was reduced when Lee 
Hu-Rak was replaced by Shin Chik-Soo (Sin Chik-Su), the latter having officially 
                                                          
15 Zagorin, Perez, “History, The Referent, and Narrative: Reflections on Postmodernism Now,” History and 
Theory, 38, No. 1 (Feb 1999): 11. 
11  
outlawed torture when he took charge. Park had fired Lee in response to the backlash 
from the American CIA who hated working with him, due in part to Lee’s heavy-handed 
tactics.16 This rise of a moderate KCIA chief happened despite strengthening political 
opposition, so it was clearly contrary to Park’s presumed political agenda and plan of 
action.  
What is needed now is a detailed examination of events and an attempt to 
honestly parse out who was primarily responsible for which decisions, policies or actions. 
The following paper starts that process of revision. Since the literature overwhelmingly 
ascribes key events to Park, the focus here will be on highlighting where Park’s agency is 
not clear or even disputed by primary evidence. The arguments will rely almost 
exclusively on primary sources, including United States Government records, newspaper 
articles, interviews and memoirs of people who were active during the time, and the 
collection of books written by Park (which are often ignored by scholars). The one 
exception is the use Chong-Sik Lee’s (I Chong-Sik) biographical work in assessing 
Park’s early life and background. Lee’s work was chosen as a source for several reasons. 
First, the primary records for that period are scarce and only in Korean mixed with 
Chinese and Japanese. Second, Lee’s use of primary evidence is exceptional and allows 
this author to fully trust his conclusions.  
Indeed, what is needed in Park Chung-Hee scholarship is a fresh and thorough 
examination of the primary record, not a reiteration of secondary sources. This paper will 
begin that process. 
 
                                                          
16 Kwon, Tae-ho, Gregg interview. 
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The Scope of this Investigation 
 
 
 
A large part of this thesis is an examination and critique of the current scholarship. 
Part of this critique involves the sources used by authors to support their arguments. The 
largest portion of the current scholarship relies on secondary sources, which can be 
problematic. Secondary sources originating from the 1980s and early 90s must be 
interpreted through the lens of the political chaos in which they were written, following 
the death of Park and the resumption of dictatorial rule by Chun Doo-Hwan (Cheon Du-
Hwan). Seungsook Moon notes that  
Chun Doo Hwan, succeeding Park through a military coup and a bloody 
crackdown on the citizens’ uprising in the city of Kwangju, deliberately tried to 
foster Park’s negative legacy in order to distance himself from Park, both despite 
and because of his apparent resemblance to him. Despite its repressive control of 
the mass media, Chun’s regime allowed for the production and consumption of 
publications and television programs critical of the Park era.17  
 
In a political environment looking to blame and punish those involved in the 
authoritarianism of the past, or to lift up the current regime, there was a distinct motive to 
cast the blame onto Park. That is not to say any of these works are inherently bad or 
deliberately misleading, but that the contexts of their writing must accepted.  
Another issue is the unquestioning acceptance of comments from memoirs of 
persons active during the period in question, particularly opponents of Park. When using 
such sources, authors fail to address potential issues with their bias or accuracy. Writers 
fail to acknowledge when citing sources by people who were in conflict with Park and 
would have motivations to color the truth in certain ways against Park and in support of 
                                                          
17 Moon, Seungsook, 2. 
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themselves. For example, Kim Young-Sam’s (Gim Yeong-Sam) close association with 
Park and the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) during the period in question has been 
well noted by historians and has been a severe burden on his reputation. Instead of trying 
to put up a serious resistance to Park’s rule, like Kim Dae-Jung (Gim Dae-Jung), Kim 
Young-Sam tried to work within the system and even accepted some of the 
authoritarianisms of the government in exchange for meeting some of the demands of his 
constituents. Are we then supposed to accept without question Kim Young-Sam’s 
account of secret promises from Park that never came to pass?18 Indeed, Byung-Kook 
Kim cites Kim Young-Sam’s own book as the source for this narrative detail, without 
noting that Kim Young-Sam had significant reasons to manipulate the truth. Kim Young-
Sam’s reputation was permanently scarred by his association with Park. It helped lift rival 
Kim Dae-Jung onto a higher pedestal; the latter is now often called the “Mandela of 
Korea.” This is despite the two having suffered similar treatment during Park’s rule. The 
latter Kim is still seen as the purest icon of Korean democracy. By suggesting there was 
some secret promise from Park, Kim Young-Sam can cast aside his share of the blame for 
helping to keep Park in power. This is not to say that Kim is certainly lying here, but that 
his account and any other insider account must be approached with a reasonable level of 
skepticism. It has become commonplace to take Kim Young-Sam, and even more so Kim 
Dae-Jung, at their word without question. However, neither man was as saintly as the 
mythology would have us believe.19 
This work bases its primary arguments on a variety of sources, some of which are 
                                                          
18 The Park Chung Hee Era, Location 2294. 
19 Richard A. Ericson Jr., who monitored the 1967 election, noted that “It was my observation in Mokpo at 
the time that Kim Dae-Jung matched Park thug for thug and rock for rock and wane for wane and pitch 
battler for pitch battler.” (Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 1998.) 
14  
United States Government sources from the State Department and intelligence agencies. 
One key weakness of these sources is that American officials were seldom present when 
political decisions were being made. Even so, the CIA proved skilled at discovering such 
information. Also utilized here is a series of interviews with American diplomats who 
served in Korea made available by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training 
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. In addition to the American witness testimony this 
paper utilizes narratives of Korean witnesses, one being a book released by a Korean 
reporter, Kim Chong-Shin (Gim Chong-Sin), shortly after the events this paper discusses, 
and another being the set of new interviews with Kim Jong-Pil published in the Korea 
Joongang Daily.20 As forms of memoir, these sources suffer the same weaknesses 
described above. However, it should be noted that despite the public backlash against 
Park, the KCIA, and the coup, Kim Jong-Pil actually accepts more responsibly than is 
generally given by historians. Certainly Kim’s narrative seems more believable than, say, 
Lee Hu-Rak’s, since the former is accepting responsibility for issues viewed negatively 
by the Korean public, and thus opening himself up to public backlash, whereas the latter 
skirts away from responsibility by blaming Park. Of course it is impossible to know 
absolutely who is telling the truth, but scholars should always evaluate their sources for 
reliability. Kim’s account is also better supported by the primary record than others, and 
his narrative even conflicts the bias one would assume him to have.  
The last significant group of sources is the collection of Park’s books. These 
sources, too, cannot be accepted out of context. It should be noted that the authorship of 
at least one book, one of the first released, was questioned by U.S. officials. These 
                                                          
20 The English language publication of the Joongang Ilbo. 
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officials suggested that the junta published it in Park’s name.21 This is not an 
unreasonable idea, since it was noted how long and hard Park worked at governing, and 
how much time he spent out on inspection tours.22 Another important consideration is 
that even though no translator is acknowledged for the books, it is unlikely that Park did 
his own English translations as he was reported as having poor English skills. Meaning 
could be lost in the translation, or even twisted for the new audience. The original books 
were targeted towards the Korean public, but the English versions clearly were not. 
Despite these weaknesses, it seems foolish for scholars to argue from Park’s point of 
view without at least having a general understanding of these writings. Even if they were 
not all written by Park, they still represent the common views of the ruling elites of 
whom Park was chief. One of the major functions of these works as a source in this thesis 
is to fill in the gaps made by the lack of their use in current scholarship.  
Unfortunately, in addition to its lack of sufficient citation and sourcing, much of 
the literature is missing any sort of visible evaluation of sources when they are used, 
especially secondary sources. This acritical reliance on such sources poses a problem for 
the next generation of scholars. Thus, I attempt to address some of these specific issues 
by reexamining the primary record. Though theory has been cited as a factor in 
highlighting these issues, this work is not a direct application of theory. Nor is it rooted in 
                                                          
21 Brazinsky, Gregg Andrew, “From Pupil to Model: South Korea and American Development Policy 
During the Early Park Chung Hee Era,” Diplomatic History 29, No. 1 (Jan 2005): 87, note 16. 
22 Regarding the junta being overworked, a telegram from Ambassador Berger in Korea, dated 28 October 
1961, noted that “Physical breakdowns from overwork becoming problem. PriMin has not been well for a 
month; Min of Comm and Ind Maj Gen Chonghmae-hyok [sic], one of ablest, collapsed from exhaustion at 
Cabinet meeting but now back to work after two weeks rest. Chairman Economic Planning Board and Vice 
Premier, Kim Yu-Taek, ordered take two months off. Chairman Pak himself showing some signs of strain 
from overwork” (FRUS, Volume 22, Document 244). For a contemporary discussion of Park’s inspection 
tours, see Kim Chong-Shin’s Seven Years with Korea’s Park Chung Hee, Chapter 14. Kim suggests that 
Park “travelled more than 100,000 miles within less than two years after the military revolution” (171). In 
light of these details, doubts regarding Park’s involvement with writing of these books are reasonable. 
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a current agenda. Perez Zagorin notes that “the business of history is with the past as a 
possible object, not the future.”23 This work is simply an attempt to reevaluate our 
understanding of this part of the past. The limited scale of this analysis cannot cover the 
whole “Park era.” As such, this paper will focus on the coup and junta period. This is 
doubly relevant since it is the most overlooked period in the historiography. Byung-Kook 
Kim’s book does provide two essays that specifically deal with the period, but they pale 
in comparison to the detail given to other periods and topics. Other scholars simply gloss 
over this period in order to get to their topics of concern, which is usually something 
economic and taking place in the 1970s. This rushed presentation often ends up being a 
highly distorted description of the period. It seems the literature views the coup as simply 
the vehicle which gets us to the industrialization period, or something that is insignificant 
by itself. 
This thesis is not a defense of Park Chung-Hee, nor a criticism of the man. In fact, 
this work is an attempt to deemphasize Park as a historical agent. I will begin to highlight 
flaws in the scholarship’s interpretation of Park’s historical role, specifically in relation to 
agency and power, and to offer some alternate explanations of the events specified 
throughout. It is this author’s opinion that Park Chung-Hee’s historical role, at least in the 
early stages of his rule, is overstated by scholars. It is the author’s opinion that the 
mythologizing of Park Chung-Hee has led to conclusions about his actions, plans, and 
intentions that are not firmly based on evidence or even inconsistent with the primary 
record. I will analyze these issues with evidence from the primary record. 
The fact is that regardless of one’s politics, Park is the one of the most important 
                                                          
23 Zagorin, 12. 
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figures in modern Korean history. For some he is a symbol of power and nationalist self-
reliance that Koreans can look back upon with pride. For others he is a symbol of the lust 
for power that has undermined the social values in the country. It is only natural for 
people to want historical figures to have some sort of grand, independent power. It makes 
remembering and dealing with the past easier if events can be attributed to one or two 
individuals rather than a countless multitude. Who can the country praise or blame if Park 
Chung-Hee was merely one member of a vast ruling collective, bound in part to the whim 
of the public? Even the most casual discussions would be more complicated if they tried 
to include all the various groups involved in the progress of history. However, it is 
reasonable to question whether his status as a key national symbol, good or bad, has led 
scholars to take much of the traditional narrative for granted, to too easily accept Park’s 
great power and agency without question. The time has come to really see how much of it 
was actually Park’s doing. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE VIEWS OF PARK CHUNG-HEE 
 
 
Several works supposedly written by Park Chung-Hee have been published. In a 
publication that was released while the junta was in power, Park wrote,  
The Leader should be neither an authoritarian nor a privileged personality 
standing apart from and reigning over the masses, but rather should share their 
destiny and be imbued with a strong sense of camaraderie. He must be prepared to 
experience their hardships and joys. He must be kind and humble in guiding the 
people; must personally set the example in tackling difficult problems.24  
 
In this single passage we can see much of Park’s professed ideals and behavior. Ironically, 
the historical literature on Park often describes the man in the very manner Park here 
opposes. According to passages from Park’s writings such as this one, Park opposed 
dictatorships, suggesting a collective of minds was much more capable of dealing with 
problems than a single, iron-fisted leader. Park’s writing suggests he was strongly against 
corruption and graft, one of the main rallying cries of his revolution. And indeed, history 
has found him personally to be one of the least corrupt presidents in the country’s history; 
the hidden stash of hoarded cash that his critics seek out has never been found.25 Park did 
not stand aloof from the public, but often was seen interacting with common people on 
                                                          
24 Park, Chung Hee, Leadership: On the Revolutionary Process (Seoul: Ministry of Public Information, 
1962): 6. 
25 Hyung-A Kim notes “Park's financial probity, even more than two decades after his assassination, has 
not been 
challenged” (Kim, “Political Corruption,” 13). 
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their farms or at the beach, though he did often keep away from the press and political 
arena. Finally, we can see the core of his political philosophy here, that a leader must 
guide the people. In contrast to Western democracy which idealizes the power of the 
people to make political decisions, Park suggested in his writings that in a Korean-style 
democracy people elect their leaders but then must follow what the leaders decide 
regarding political matters. In all, there is much insight to be gained from analyzing 
Park’s writings, which is why it is regretful that they are usually ignored by scholars. 
Park Chung-Hee’s political philosophy and personal views are available in several 
official books published during his time in power. Since these books were a public forum 
for political thought, and many were published by the government, they should not be 
taken fully at face value. Moreover, the authorship of the works, especially the first, was 
questioned at the time of their release. It is also unclear who did the English translations 
for these works. Therefore it is impossible to say for certain whether these works were 
directly (or indirectly) written by Park. Certainly, as government publications during his 
time in power, Park must have had some level of oversight. They also do express the 
views of the ruling collective of which Park was the head, so they can still shed light on 
the political views of Park and his peers. From here on this paper will reference Park as 
author of the works for the sake of simplicity. 
  It is important to note that Park wrote these books for a domestic Korean 
audience, to explain his ideas and plans, and to convince his people to support these 
policies. Interestingly, the consistency of many arguments throughout almost twenty 
years of writing adds a sense of honesty and genuineness. Though the books tend to focus 
on different issues, they often incorporate similar themes and arguments. The most 
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common are a critical view of Korean history; a strong hatred of corruption and 
dishonesty; and a focus on raising people from poverty as the first step of development. 
What does tend to change in the later books is the specificity and tone of the arguments. 
In earlier works the arguments feel like vaguer concepts, whereas in the later works they 
are more focused and have a stronger tilt towards propaganda.26  
Park’s writing can be divided into four key themes. First, Park expressed his 
negative view of Korean history and how events led to contemporary circumstances. Park 
held little back in his attacks on the Korean past, particularly the weakness of the Joseon 
Dynasty rulers. Second, Park explained Korea’s position on the global stage and how 
international experience could be applied to the Korean situation. Park could be rather 
aggressive in criticizing how global powers had abused Korea throughout history. He 
also was very knowledgeable about the contemporary position of Korea and how global 
politics affected the country. Third, and one that is more frequently seen in the early 
works, Park argued for the necessity of revolution in Korea. He often cited the corruption 
of government officials and mismanagement as being key factors that led him to decide 
to participate in a coup. Forth, in a collection of interrelated topics that are more present 
in the later works, Park described his views on industrialization, modernization and 
democracy. Park was consistent in his idea that development must target the poor and 
that strong industrialization is necessary for national security due to provocation from 
                                                          
26 For example, the idea of national self-reliance is a recurring concept throughout all of Park’s writing. 
Early on this is more of a general sentiment, sometimes related to Park’s shameful views of Korea’s history 
and national weakness in the past. In one of his last books he gives this idea a distinct name, tying it to the 
Korean term jaju, which he defines as a spirit of political and economic self-reliance. This could be the 
result of a more than a decade of fine tuning his political philosophy, but it also rings of propaganda 
designed to capitalize on a rising ethnic nationalism in Korea at the time. As such, his early works do tend 
to come off as more sincere than the later ones. 
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North Korea. Park argued that merely copying Western democracy in Korea had already 
failed and would continue to fail because of the different cultural context. Park suggested 
that a more communally-focused democracy, where the needs of the state override the 
needs of individuals, is a better fit for the Korean context.  
The following chapter will look at some of these themes and analyze quotes from 
Park’s books in detail. The ideas Park expressed regarding democracy and 
industrialization, however, are not very relevant to the early period of Park’s rule, since a 
junta is by definition non-democratic, and industrialization had not begun at that time. 
Instead, this chapter will focus on the ideas that created the impetus for revolution. The 
examination of Park’s writings should be a component of any analysis of Park’s rule, and 
one should not ignore the many places where government actions contradicted his 
recommendations. The most obvious example is the conflict between Park’s professed 
support of democracy and his government’s authoritarianism, especially in later years. It 
is possible that Park and his critics defined democracy differently, or that government 
actions were the result of external pressures that Park had to comply with regardless of 
his personal views. Even a hardline critique of Park’s government’s authoritarianism 
should consider the contradiction of word and action. From either direction, it stands out 
as something that doesn’t comfortably fit the events and issues of the time. To assume he 
was simply lying when he praised democracy is risky given the myriad of forces that 
pushed the government’s policies away from the ideals expressed in Park’s writing. 
Divining what these forces were is far beyond the scope of this paper, except to 
acknowledge their existence and encourage scholars to consider them. This chapter will 
attempt to parse out Park’s views as described in his writings as preparation for the later 
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analysis of the historical actions attributed to Park being addressed by this paper. 
 
Views on Korean History 
 
 
 
Park’s writings often include sharp criticisms of Korea’s former leaders and elites. 
These views influenced most of Park’s main ideas: the need for revolution, the need to 
fight corruption, and the need for industrialization and modernization. When reading 
Park’s analysis of his country’s history, one cannot help but feel a sense of shame in him 
for his country’s weakness in the past. Park evinces concern about repeating past 
mistakes and failing the country himself, as many of these past leaders did.  
So, too, do his historical views show the effect that historical discourse during his 
upbringing had on his perception of history. Many of these ideas were based on a concept 
of Korean racial purity, of a country with a long and continuously connected history. As 
noted by archaeologist Hyung-il Pai (Bae Hyeong-il) in her book Constructing “Korean” 
Origins, these ideas were often factually flawed, and were descended from Japanese 
imperialist agendas. Even by the time of Park’s writing, some of these ideas were 
beginning to become outdated. For example, Park regards “the Korean race with more 
than four thousand years of history.”27 In another book he states “it is Koreans who 
shaped an ancient history that goes back over five thousand years. . . . a homogenous 
people who have shared unusual solidarity through thick and thin.”28 Both the ideas of a 
pure and ancient Korean race and the five thousand year old origin of Korean state 
                                                          
27 Park, Chung Hee, Our Nation’s Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction, Second Edition (Seoul: Dong-A 
Publishing, 1964): 107. 
28 Park, Chung Hee, Korea Reborn: A Model for Development (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1979): 
21. 
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history have since been debunked by scholars like Pai, as well as by modern study of 
ethnology and migration.  
Park often relied on loaded terms like “the orient,” and comparisons with the 
West in his discussions.29 He often gauged the level of development of these “oriental” 
countries—co-opting the Western use of the term describing Asia and the Middle East—
by comparing them to a Western standard. For example, when describing the rise of 
modern Japan and China, Park noted,  
Korea, due to her geopolitical position and topography, remained as the sole 
unmodernized country, though all others opened their doors to the onrush of 
Western civilization. . . . It is in fact under these conditions the independence of 
countries depended on how quickly and efficiently they digested Western 
civilization. It also became the norm by which to measure the degree of 
civilization in Eastern countries. 
 
At this point one might think that he was critiquing Asian capitulation to Western powers, 
but he added, “We were a hermit nation. Why did we remain behind while other 
countries marched forward to modernization? The answer to this question may vary with 
the opinions of different people, but internally, our leaders were too negative, evasive and 
blind toward the changing pattern of the world.”30 
Interestingly, Park contradicted himself on this issue in later works. His early 
works suggested that Westernization was the proper path for development. Though he did 
argue that purely Western democracy was not a good fit for Korea, he initially held that 
general Western social values were superior to their Korean counterparts. Park’s attack 
on what he saw as a negative, do-nothing attitude in the song Arirang, was such a critique. 
In Arirang, the singer curses the lover who abandoned him rather than trying to get her 
                                                          
29 Park, Chung Hee, The Country, the Revolution and I, Second Edition (Seoul: HollyM Corporation, 1970): 
92.  
30 Park, Our Nation’s Path, 107-108.  
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back. Park suggested that “Western European girls would have clung to the lover’s 
neck.”31 He also compared Korean “honor” and European chivalry, noting that the 
Korean version conveyed a sense that people “preferred to die easily and avoid 
responsibility.”32 Later works stepped back from this, emphasizing the protection of 
Korean tradition and focusing more on the mixing of Eastern and Western ideas. For 
example, in one of his last books, Park argued that “[n]ot a few learned people, misled 
into thinking that modernization was Westernization, blamed our age-old poverty and 
historical stagnation of Korea’s traditional-bound culture.”33 The distinction is not a 
complete reversal, but more of a shift from a slight Western emphasis to a slight Korean 
one. While he probably did change his views during the years he was in power, this shift 
in focus might also have been an attempt to capture the ethnic nationalist sentiments so 
prevalent when the book was released.  
Park often needed to compare his culture with that of the West in order to make a 
point, such as with his critique of Arirang. It was less than two decades later when 
Edward Said’s groundbreaking work brought these “orientalist” arguments into serious 
doubt. But the above quote on geopolitics does highlight one of Park’s major historical 
concerns: the Joseon regime's weakness and consequent failure to prevent imperialism.34  
As the above passages suggest, Park saw the Joseon period as being the root of all 
of Korea’s modern problems. For example, he argued that “Our present national traits of 
                                                          
31 Park, Our Nation’s Path, 75,80. 
32 Ibid., 80. 
33 Park, Korea Reborn, 33. 
34 The irony is that in a post-orientalism world, the Joseon Dynasty might deserve praise for trying to hold 
on to its cultural identity in spite of external aggression. Park also seems to contradict himself at times 
when he argued elsewhere that Koreans need to protect their culture and that Western democracy needs to 
be modified for a Korean context. 
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reliance upon others, truckling, and blind obedience to the ruler, all have their origin in 
the five centuries of the Yi [Joseon] Dynasty. Our factionalism, exclusionism, and special 
privilege consciousness which abet national disunity, are all direct derivatives of the 
feudal caste system and mandarin bureaucracy of the Yi Dynasty.”35 Here we can see 
many of Park’s early targets for critical attack, specifically factionalism and special 
privilege. He saw these character faults as barriers to development and linked them 
directly to the Confucian politics and philosophy of that time. In another work he argued 
that “Not long ago in Korea, it was almost considered demeaning, under Confucian 
influence, to engage in manual labor. . . . No society that despises labor can expect to 
develop itself.”36 He directly connected these faults to past tragedies. For example, Park 
wrote, “The ceaseless factional strife under the Yi Dynasty invited the national disaster of 
the Japanese invasion masterminded by Toyotomi Hideyoshi.”37  
Park centered his critique on the Joseon, Yi Dynasty, arguing that “[b]efore the Yi 
Dynasty the Korean people had by no means been a subservient nation. The Kingdom of 
Goguryo was an Oriental power of the first rank with wide territories in what is now 
Manchuria; the people of Goguryo were progressive culturally and aggressive in war.”38 
Park directly criticized the founder of the Yi Dynasty, Yi Song-Gye (I Song-Gye), by 
                                                          
35 Park, Our Nation’s Path, 13. 
36 Park, Korea Reborn, 77-78. 
37 Park, Our Nation’s Path, 13. 
38 Ibid., 39. – This is arguably an inaccurate statement. Although Goguryeo was more independent than the 
other early Korean states, it was still dependent on China to some extent. Its leaders still sought legitimacy 
from the Chinese emperor and asked China to intervene in certain conflicts with its neighbors. Moreover, 
the progressive culture that Park cites here was largely imported from China. Park suggests that 
“Throughout the five hundred years of the Yi Dynasty, its basic foreign policy was vassalage” (Our 
Nation’s Path, 38-39). The fact is that vassalage to China was much more common than not with the early 
Korean states, even Goguryeo. Park attributes the idea of Korean vassalage in its history as a product of 
Goryeo historian Kim Pu-sik (Gim Pu-sik). Hyung-il Pai, in her comprehensive work, shows that such 
attacks on Kim were rooted in the nationalist revisionism that was prevalent during the first half of the 20th 
century. 
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suggesting he “had not been inspired by any new ideals of statecraft and benevolent 
government, but only by a desire for personal power.”39 Here Park drew a distinct line 
between rulers who held benevolent ideals and those who only desired power.  
It is worth considering such passages when attempting to argue that Park was 
personally driven to keep power for himself. This is often the argument made in current 
scholarship, and is often lacking in clear evidence. Not that the accusations are 
necessarily inaccurate, but we should expect some specific proof that counters the above 
commentary. To be clear, this paper does not dismiss outright Park’s drive for power; it 
does, however, argue that evidence proving either case is circumstantial at best.  The 
historiographical problem is the tendency to argue opposite cases in absolute terms 
despite the lack of clear proof when each is an educated guess unworthy of additional 
weighting. 
The faults of the Joseon elite were embodied for Park in the story of Chun-Hyang. 
This is the story of a courtesan’s chaste daughter whose yangban lover, Yi Mong-Ryong 
leaves her to become an official in the capital. She is later abused by a lustful governor 
while the local people, intimidated by their ruler, do nothing to help. Eventually her lover 
returns as a royal inspector, saving her and taking down the villain. Contrary to the 
common view that Yi was a hero, Park argued that his action “evinces the cowardliness 
of his class by sacrificing his love for the sake of his status and official position.”40 
Moreover, Park noted that the story as a whole “brings to light the diseased state of Yi 
society in which the spirit of popular resistance to authoritarianism was totally non-
                                                          
39 Ibid., 38. 
40 Ibid., 50. 
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existent.”41 
Park ultimately blamed Koreans for their own historical problems. Regarding 
Korea’s victimization by imperialistic world powers, Park suggested,  
Even if the geographical position of Korea has made it a place of suffering and 
although the international situation made this country a battleground for foreign 
powers, Korea need not necessarily or inevitably be a victim of foreign aggression. 
History is made by man. History is moulded [sic] by the subjective efforts and 
desires of man. Whether the country was protected or lost, whether the national 
culture was improved or degraded, nobody but the Korean people were and are 
responsible for the development of Korean history.42 
 
Here we can see the early roots of Park’s ideological focus on self-reliance. He was well-
versed in world history, and was not reluctant to highlight the role that foreign powers 
played in Korea’s tragic past.  
Park argued that “[w]hen Japanese imperialism swept across the Korean 
Peninsula it destroyed the balance of power in this region and, thus, peace in Asia.”43 
Even so, he still faulted Koreans for failing to resist these powers. Park suggested “[t]he 
Port Hamilton incident might well have marked the decisive moment for Korea to turn 
her eyes toward the outside world, but the royal court did not sufficiently grasp the 
meaning of the incident or the warning it contained.”44 The incident in question was a 
conflict between Russia and Britain over the opening of ports in Korea, which took the 
form of a series of foreign interventions and aggressive acts, and the end result of which 
was Japan’s annexation of Korea as a colony. Foreign powers had caused the catastrophe, 
but Park blamed the Korean rulers for not preventing it. He stated “What could be found 
in Korea in the age of imperialism was a power vacuum. Neither the Korean government 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 135. 
43 Park, Chung Hee, To Build a Nation (Washington D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1971):138 
44 Ibid., 33. 
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nor its ruling class possessed the capability of mobilizing the people for the nation’s 
defense. The caste-ridden ruling class curried foreign favor in its own struggles.”45 Not 
only are Park’s common critiques of factionalism and power struggles seen here; so is his 
recognition of the power vacuum created by the existence of a crippled Korean 
government surrounded by imperial powers. The idea of power fluctuations and vacuums 
appears repeatedly in Park’s writings, suggesting a sincere concern that Korea might end 
up in the same situation if it didn’t industrialize and strengthen itself. He genuinely feared 
such a power vacuum in Korea again, or perhaps worse, that he could be the ruler in 
charge when Korea again fell prey to foreign powers. 
Even without that worst case scenario, Park’s view of the history of his country 
was highly pessimistic. “So weighed down by the force of negative historical conditions 
have we been,” he lamented, “that seldom have our people had a chance to stand up 
straight and straighten their backs.”46 However, Park also sought out parts of Korea’s past 
that could be utilized for nationalist purposes. Especially in his later works, Park wrote 
respectfully of Korean traditional culture and a need to protect it, a contrast with early 
works that hints at political spin. In one of his last books, Park argued  
Not so long ago, it used to be fashionable among some intellectuals to study the 
history and acquire the culture of other nations at the expense of our own . . . Few 
things are more unfortunate or shameful than this habit. He who does not 
comprehend himself will not understand others; he who does not grasp his 
country’s past will never understand the world.47 
 
This is a step beyond his early critique of those who equated “modernization with 
Westernization.”  
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Park certainly did have a keen grasp of the world and his country’s place in it. He 
did not have to look hard to find heroes in his country’s history that he could invoke for 
his purposes. He praised the groups in the late Joseon period that fought for 
modernization. He argued that the Kaehwa Tongip Party of 1884 were “progressive 
young patriots . . . [who] correctly grasped the need for modernization.”48 Park also 
argued that the Tonghak Rebellion of 1894 was the first “democratic revolution” and the 
starting point of modernization, noting the “[p]rinciples for the construction of a new 
society and the Revolution included the popular Tonghak philosophy ‘Man is God’ which 
was the beginning of the Koreanization of democracy. The principles were not directly 
imported from any Western philosophy.”49 He even praised the anti-Japanese fighters of 
the colonial era as heroes deserving of praise.50  
Park was able to find the positive figures he needed to inspire nationalism in his 
people, which he thought was required for fast development. At times he seemed to 
invoke Korean history as inspiration for his own revolutionary goals, an interesting 
contrast with his usually unreserved assaults on the Joseon elites. For example, he praised 
the coup of Chung-Jong in 1506, noting that “In protest against the notoriously 
undisciplined, immoral life and tyranny of Prince Yon-San, a coup took place . . . Chung-
Jong wanted to eliminate the former corruption . . . and his followers advocated 
revolutionary reform.”51 It’s hard not to see the trajectory of Park’s rise reflected in this 
story from four hundred years in the past. 
Park found other historical figures and events that inspired him, but it was the 
                                                          
48 Park, To Build a Nation, 41. 
49 Park, Our Nation’s Path, 104 
50 Ibid., 6. 
51 Park, Our Nation’s Path, 62. 
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negative parts of his country’s history that seemed to absorb Park’s attention more often. 
A strong sense of shame radiates from his writing, shame in the weakness and perhaps 
“backwardness” of his country. It is not hard to imagine that the man could have been 
adamant about not repeating the mistakes of the past. Park surely did not want to be a 
source of shame for future generations by failing to fight the typical corruption and 
factionalism of his country, or failing to strengthen the country vis-à-vis foreign powers. 
This had direct implications in his promotion of self-reliance, hard work, and security of 
the state over full freedom. It also showed his keen sense of world history and politics. 
 
Views on Korea’s Relations with the World 
 
 
 
Park Chung-Hee was well aware of Korea’s precarious global position. Its 
geographic location placed it directly between the competing imperial powers of Asia, 
China and Japan, and made it an important strategic location for both Asian and Western 
powers. As has been shown above, Park was disgusted by the Yi Dynasty’s close relation 
to China, which he saw as a “legacy of subservience.”52 And he specifically blamed 
Japan for breaking the peace with its own imperial expansion. The abuse Korea suffered 
was something that happened repeatedly throughout history. Park argued “Making our 
life more miserable were our bigger neighbors, who seldom gave us peace. Whenever a 
new power rose on the continent to the north, or from the ocean to the south, Korea was 
invariably fixed as their first target of aggression, causing us unspeakable hardship.”53 
Park understood that Korea’s problems with the world were as much a result of internal 
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weakness as of external forces. Park ultimately blamed Korean leaders for this: 
Had the leaders and the led been firmly united, concentrating their efforts to 
strengthen the nation’s power, the tragedy of Japan’s occupation of Korea might 
have been averted. By failing to perceive the nature of changes in the international 
situation and indulging themselves in the schisms and blatant dependence of 
foreigners, our leaders could not but leave behind for us a legacy of excruciating 
sorrow.54 
 
Park not only understood Korea's past vulnerability, that of a small country lying in the 
shadow of its larger neighbors, but he thought it could be overcome by economic and 
military strength. 
 Korea’s economic immaturity and lack of modernization made it a target for 
nineteenth century European imperialists looking for new markets to dominate. Park 
viewed the opening of Korea to European trade in highly negative terms, primarily 
because he saw the incoming Westerners as strong and Korea as weak. He suggested that 
“[a]fter the Korean-American Friendship Agreement of 1882, various European nations 
concluded friendship agreements with Korea, and the situation of Korea at that time was 
similar to a piece of meat eyed by a pack of hungry dogs.”55 Moreover, Park viewed any 
friendship offered by foreign powers as being fickle at best. Park argued that “[i]t is a 
conventional method adopted by strong powers, both today and in the past, to sacrifice 
powerless third nations in order to conclude an alliance or avoid war in international 
                                                          
54 Ibid., 23. – Another interesting contradiction is seen here between Park’s late and early works. In one of 
his first books, regarding the international pressure on Korea, Park suggested “Since aggressive powers 
were attempting to invade us, we should have sought help from other nations” (Our Nation’s Path, 135). 
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politics.”56 He even cited a specific example of this when he noted “it was natural at that 
time for Japan to demand control of Korea and for Britain to offer Korea as a sacrificial 
victim to Japan in an attempt to utilize the growing power of Japan in its counter-Russian 
policy.”57 Here again we can see Park’s strong understanding of global politics as well as 
his revulsion of Korea’s past weakness.  
Park’s view of Japan as a shadowy threat, actively affecting Korea politics, can be 
seen in his early writings. Park often blamed the previous regimes and their elites for pro-
Japanese stances and behavior. He argued that during the Rhee regime “[t]he influence of 
Japan became strong, showing its tempting face in politics, economy, culture and 
society.”58 Interestingly, these comments were published around the same time the junta 
started secret negotiations to restore formal ties with Japan, something that the Rhee 
government wanted but failed to do. Despite his personal ties to Japan, growing up during 
the peak of colonialism and having served with the Japanese military, Park seemed to be 
wary of the country politically. This awareness of past foreign aggression suggests how 
Park could have become determined to make his country strong and independent at 
almost any cost.  
During Park’s time that issue became urgent. Not only was the contest of foreign 
power seen clearly in the Korean War, the Cold War afterwards had similar implications. 
He noted that “indications began to appear that Northeast Asia, including Korea, was 
once again turning into a focus for Big Power rivalry. By 1971, with the withdrawal from 
Korea of one U.S. infantry division in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, the United 
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States commitment to Northeast Asia in general appeared greatly reduced.”59 Not only do 
we see here Park’s concern of Korea falling victim to foreign competition, but also of the 
fickleness of the support of foreign powers.  
Park feared that the United States would fully abandon its ally if such a move 
became necessary or beneficial. Indeed, the threat of U.S. abandonment comes up often in 
Park’s writing. For example, he emphasized a U.S. preference for Japan over Korea when 
he stated “the United States considered Japan, then under occupation, as the dyke [sic] for 
democracy in the Far East, while regarding Korea and Manchuria as if secondary 
importance.”60 Park also suggested that “the U.S. policy toward Korea . . . was ‘military’ 
as far as its basic nature was concerned.”61 He even suggested that U.S. aid policies were 
a hindrance to growth, observing that the U.S. had “adopted a mode of thinking which 
was at variance with our real needs.”62 Park was clearly wary of his country’s chief ally, 
whose support for Korea seemed less than what it offered to Japan, whose policies 
focused on U.S. needs at the expense of Korean needs, and whose agenda differed from 
its Korean counterpart. For a devout nationalist, this was a clear threat.  
 Park’s response to this threat was self-reliance. He wrote “we could not allow the 
tragedy of our past to repeat itself in Korea by letting our complacent attitude, political 
quarrels and psychology of dependence reassert themselves. . . . our generation bears the 
responsibility for strengthening the nation’s power by ourselves.”63 In light of real threats 
from foreign powers, and the apparent unreliability of its allies, he believed that he and 
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his countrymen were duty-bound to strengthen the nation, regardless of the cost. Failure 
to do so would mean the return of "Big Power" imperialism—a much more significant 
threat than Communism or North Korea. It is not hard to imagine that Park was doubly 
worried about this happening during his watch, and his reputation thus falling to the level 
of his despised ancestors.  Moreover, he suggested the situation had implications beyond 
the fate of Korea alone. “History," he warned, "proves that whenever Korea becomes a 
battlefield for the powerful, the peace and security of East Asia are at stake. In this sense, 
Korea holds the key to peace in East Asia.”64 
Not that Park favored returning to Korean being a political hermit. He appreciated 
the positive support of foreign allies, often praising the UN member states that rescued 
his country during the Korean War. Indeed, he was convinced that “[t]he devotion of UN 
member nations, which rendered both moral and material assistance to Korea to defend 
this nation and fought against the Communist aggression was unswerving and heroic.”65 
Regarding Korea’s closest ally and biggest supporter Park said “We like America. We 
like their system of liberal democracy. They liberated us, they protected us from 
Communist invasion, they aided us economically. Above all, we like Americans because 
they have not tried to enslave us, nor make unreasonable demands of us.”66  
In addition to understanding the value of his allies, Park’s international 
perspective also saw value in other cultures and other nations’ history. Park championed 
what he called the “German work ethic” as something for his people to emulate:  
the Germans believe that one can serve God best by being faithful to one’s 
mundane Beruf [occupation]. In other words, they think that worldly jobs, 
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commerce and money earning are tasks conferred on individuals by God, that 
they are not a means to an end but life itself, life’s aim itself. Thus they feel loyal 
to their jobs and responsible for their duties. The West Germans, who achieved 
the “Miracle on the Rhine” after the Second World War, have been diligent and 
hardworking, inspired by this healthy concept of occupation.67 
 
While many scholars declare that Park was influenced by the Japanese Meiji 
development, which is true to some extent, it is much too simple to suggest this was his 
only point of international reference or influence. While Park’s attendance at Japanese 
colonial schools, service in the Japanese imperial military, and praise of the Meiji 
reforms have led some to believe that Japan was all he knew or cared about, the above 
passage proves otherwise. It not hard to attribute the term “Miracle on the Han,” 
commonly used to describe the rapid Korean economic growth, to German origins. Park 
also praised Germany for its ability to become economically independent of the United 
States, an example he saw as “a cause for envy.”68 
While it is true that Park was inspired from the story of the Meiji reforms, this 
was only one of many international examples Park used as inspiration for his revolution. 
Park also praised Sun Yat-Sen’s revolutionary attempts in China, noting Sun’s 
philosophy “maintained that the only way to save China was to destroy the Ching court 
and make a new start as a modern, democratic nation.”69 Park had set out on a similar 
path, to destroy his country’s government and rebuild it as a new nation. Park did also 
commend Japan, noting that it “became, within ten years after the Meiji Reform, the most 
potent power of the Far East. This was indeed a surprise to Asia, a miracle!”70  
But Park’s inspiration from the world was not limited to East Asia, he also cited 
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Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal Pasha71 who he described as “the father of Turkey. Whenever 
we think of Turkey, we cannot forget this hero of the revolution.”72 Park seems to have 
particularly like Kemal since he was a military leader. Regarding the revolution in 
Turkey, Park suggested, “This splendid history of revolution was edited with blood for 
the sake of world peace and national independence. This valuable lesson is not the 
property of the Turkish people alone.”73 Park also commended Egypt’s Gamal Abdel 
Nasser for his overthrow of the monarchy there. In particular he praised Nasser for his 
popular support, industrial drive, and his belief that Egypt needed to define itself rather 
than simply adopting Western ideas. Park quoted Nasser as having said: “We are neither 
capitalistic, nor communistic. We are just building our own society.”74 It is not hard to 
imagine Park uttering these very words himself. As can be seen, there were certainly 
many more global influences on Park than just Meiji Japan. 
Park was clearly concerned about the world and Korea’s place in it. He was 
inspired by revolutionary movements in other parts of the world, and wary of what he 
called the “Big Powers” who had left a sordid legacy in Korea. He feared renewed 
aggression from these powers and also abandonment by his allies. All of this should not 
be ignored when analyzing this period of Korean history. It certainly had a strong impact 
on the behavior of Park and his contemporaries. The reality of Korea’s world position, its 
history of weakness and victimization, and the light from the successes of other 
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revolutions abroad seemed to have had an influence on Park and his peers, and their 
move towards revolution in their own country. 
 
Views on the Necessity of Revolution 
 
 
 
Park’s understanding of Korea’s history and global position fused with the 
weakness and corruption of the Chang Myon government to create an impetus towards 
revolution. First and foremost, Park blamed poverty for necessitating revolution. He 
stated, “Poverty should be blamed for the two revolutions we have experienced. 
Revolution was an explosion of absolute will of the people to improve their economic 
circumstances.”75 The first revolution Park cites here was the April Student Movement in 
1960 which forced Rhee Syngman from power, the second was his own. Park laid the 
blame for Korea’s poverty at the feet of the two previous regimes, those of Rhee and 
Chang. Writing soon after the junta took power, Park argued that  
thoughtless former governments, knowing no day of peace, turned their face from 
agriculture, devoted their energy to tertiary consumer industry, and indulged in 
corruption and political strife. . . . They did some heap [sic] service only to 
industries with which they had direct connections and played arbitrarily with 
agricultural policy matters. As a consequence, the rural communities became 
impoverished and farmers had to desert their farms to flock to the cities. The 
resultant discouragement of productive will and scattering of the labor force has 
brought about the explosive food crisis of today. Whatever else we may consider 
at this point, the most urgent and fundamental need is that the rural communities 
should have precedence over everything else. . . . Whoever may take over power, 
national reconstruction will be in vain without the reconstruction of the perplexed 
farming villages.76 
 
Supporting farmers was not simply a political move for Park and his fellow junta leaders, 
since as Park acknowledged, farmers accounted for “75% of the total population” at that 
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time.77  
In addition to blaming former leaders for not supporting the rural poor, Park also 
criticized their economic policies. He argued, “The Korean economy under the previous 
regimes suppressed agriculture and stultified manufacturing, fattening the process only in 
tertiary industry. . . . The rulers, at the time, should have devised a policy to promote 
import-replacing industries. But for ten consecutive years they acted indifferent.”78 He 
cited the lack of development in natural resource industries, such as coal and tungsten, as 
a specific failure of previous regimes that hindered economic growth. Park also blamed 
the Rhee regime for, on the one hand, relying too heavily on foreign aid, and on the other, 
failing to use it properly. Park argued that in spite of an apparent decrease in U.S. 
financial support for Korea, the Rhee government “continued its desperate attempts to 
obtain more aid from foreign countries—completely overlooking the changing trends in 
world affairs.”79 Park added to this the critique that “[l]ittle successful effort was made to 
make wise use of this aid, or to actuate an effective policy aimed at making self-reliant 
economic development possible.”80 Park apparently thought that Rhee and Chang Myon 
had failed at their basic tasks of governance, and continued poverty was the direct result. 
Though Park and his comrades cited the elimination of poverty as a key purpose 
of the revolution, their most overt target was corruption. Eliminating corruption was one 
of the original public pledges of the coup-makers. As has been mentioned Park viewed 
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factionalism, power-mongering, and corruption as legacies from the Joseon era. He also 
thought corruption was reinforced by the devastation of the Korean War. Regarding the 
aftermath of the war, Park argued that “[a] sort of nihilism grew from the horrible 
experiences of war. The extravagant greed for material gains, stimulated by the influx of 
foreign aid goods, turned the people of Korea in the wrong direction.”81  Interestingly his 
commentary often skips over the effects of the colonial period, which are now recognized 
as having been significant. This may be due to the fact that Korean leaders were not in 
control during this period, and Park’s ire is usually directed at domestic Korean 
leadership.  
Park saw both the Rhee and Chang regimes as being equally bad, arguing that 
“both were corrupt as they were possible to be.”82 Specific grievances Park had against 
these regimes included illegal profiteering and dispensing special favors to supporters, 
going so far as to say that “[t]he Assemblymen were merely a special, privileged class of 
employment agents carrying sackfuls [sic] of job applications, and promoters in the pay 
of private business interests.”83 He suggested that “[t]hose in power, with their 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, fell apart from the people, abused their power 
and authority, and amassed large fortunes in collusion with corrupt elements.”84 On a 
whole, Park suggested that “[t]he economy was faced with collapse. . . . People 
fatalistically took poverty and reliance on foreign aid as unavoidable facts of life. 
Businessmen and industrialists failed to fulfill their important role in economic 
development. Many corrupt government officials and parvenus worked together to amass 
                                                          
81 Ibid., 96. 
82 Park, Our Nation’s Path, 174.  
83 Ibid., 175, 10. 
84 Park, Leadership, 5. 
40  
illegal fortunes.”85 Taken at face value, it is easy to assume that this was the 1961 coup's 
principal cause. 
Certainly this rhetoric is oft repeated outside of the official publications as well. It 
is impossible to be certain though the bulk of the primary evidence, including the official 
government publications, the recollections of witnesses like Kim Jong-Pil and Kim 
Chong-Shin, contemporary news reports, and the diplomatic assessments of junta leaders 
by the U.S. Government, indicate that these men wanted to fight corruption early on.  
Park later recalled, “I was overwhelmed with sorrow that I had been born in this land at 
such a time. I stayed awake nights, planning how I might save the nation from its crisis, 
by whatever means were available to me.”86 It is difficult to prove whether the man’s sole 
concern was to gain power, and it certainly requires substantial primary support. In 
regards to Park’s story, it ignores a large component of the historical record that suggests 
otherwise. Again, this is not to argue with any certainty against the idea that Park was 
concerned with his own power, but that the current scholarship lacks the evidence 
required to make such an assertion in absolute terms, as is often the case. 
Park saw achieving “economic development and [improving] the living standard 
of the people as a prerequisite to building democracy” but Korea had started on the 
opposite path, with democratic-like politics before economics.87 “The aim of our 
revolution," Park declared, "was not to ignore the value of democracy but to lay a solid 
foundation for rebuilding true democracy.”88 He was adamant about his cause, arguing 
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that “without the revolution the country would have fallen!”89 This view came not from 
an external assessment, but from within, after he took over what he described as “a burnt, 
robbed house.”90  
More frequently, he compared his nation to a sick patient whose only doctors 
were the revolutionaries. In defending the restriction of freedoms imposed by the junta, 
Park suggested, “The doctor may temporarily restrict the physical activities of the patient 
for the sake of complete cure and recovery, and even force him to submit to painful 
surgery, when necessary. . . . Surgical operations are not pleasant, but they can be 
accepted as a necessary evil—as a small sacrifice to save the whole.”91 Early on, Park 
seemed to have clear ideas about how the situation in his country could be fixed. He 
suggested “Korean politics will not be reformed unless the standards of the people are 
raised, a change of generations (to replace the former politicians) is promoted, the 
contents of elections are studied, and an open system for the procurement of political 
funds is worked out by means of consistent policies through social enlightenment.”92 
This passage, like others in Park's early writings, sees revolution as a route to 
better political conditions for posterity; “a national, common people’s revolution of 
national consciousness, and a turnover of generations.”93  The goal was a democratic 
welfare state and the agents were “new generations composed of soldiers, students and 
intellectuals.”94  
 Park wrote, “Just as a father toils, not only for his own pleasure but for the sake 
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of his beloved posterity, a revolution too seeks more the happiness of tomorrow than 
security of the present. Therefore, the generation in which a revolution occurs must suffer. 
Can any parent say that he would rather live well himself than make his posterity live 
well?”95 Park did not expect to reap the benefits of his own revolution, so it is 
understandable that he would expect others to be willing to sacrifice in the same way, and 
that conflict would occur with those unwilling to suffer it. Certainly, Park did not have 
the right to decide which sacrifices each citizen had to make. Perhaps some of the conflict 
between Park and his opponents came from such differing expectations. 
Park ultimately saw his revolution as a starting point in a long period of progress 
and modernization. He stated,  
The May 16 Military Revolution must be understood as the real starting point of 
our national task in our modern history—a democratic revolution for the 
achievement of an independent economy, which began with the Liberation in 
1945 and was re-emphasized by the April 19 Students’ Uprising. It was also the 
newest link in the strong chain of our social history, consistently flowing through 
the Tonghak Peasant’s Revolution, the March 1, 1919 National Independence 
Movement and the founding ideologies of the Republic of Korea.96 
 
In light of such statements, and the man’s thorough grasp of the flow of world history, it 
does seem risky to argue that he was solely focused on maintaining his own power. It is 
possible that he was willing to stay in power for the remainder of his life because he 
never felt his task, the original foundations of his revolution, had been completed. The 
rise of an arguably worse dictatorship, in the form of the Chun Doo-Hwan regime, seems 
to attest to the incompleteness of Park’s revolution, as per the ideals expressed in his 
books. The egalitarian dreams of his writing have become even more distant in recent 
years. Ironically, this has much to do with the economic policies of Park’s own 
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government. 
 It is easy to assume that his staying in power was a result of a distinct desire for 
power, that such an idea is the simplest and thus most accurate conclusion. However, it 
ignores the scores of other agents who had motive to keep Park at the top, and also the 
necessity of public support in the form of numerous elections and referendums. Even 
blatant election fraud has its limits under the international eye, and even then other agents 
are needed who are committed to the cause for their own reasons. We can certainly say 
without reservation that the government during Park’s presidency was authoritarian, but 
what is not clear and well-evidenced is just how much was specifically Park’s will.97  
Ultimately, Park’s views were much more complex than “rich nation, strong 
army,” the simplified slogan often repeated in the modern literature.98 As has been shown 
here, Park professed a diverse range of views that probably influenced his political 
thinking. He had a very pessimistic view of Korean history, in which he attacked the past 
leaders for their weakness. Park also had a keen sense of world history which he applied 
to his own country’s politics. Beyond simply wanting to emulate Meiji Japan, he was 
influenced by the German work ethic, revolutions in Turkey and Egypt, and the Chinese 
democratic movement, amongst other things. Park suggested that he respected democracy, 
in a certain form, and sincerely wanted to implement it in Korea. However, he placed 
stability and development higher in priority, arguing that democracy would not function 
without a sufficient economic base. He also argued that there was a real security threat to 
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the country and that the limitation of individual rights could be justified if deemed 
necessary for the welfare of the state.  
All of these ideas, as well at the pattern of their evolution over time, should be a 
part of any full analysis of the politics during the period of Park’s rule. It certainly offers 
a means to help us understand how Park and his peers could feel justified in their 
authoritarian practices. To ascribe it to a mere lust for power is too simple an answer if 
only because no man has ever stayed in power merely on the force of his own will. There 
are always other self-motivated agents and political contexts that help it come to pass.  
The contradiction between the ideals Park professed in his writing and the actions of his 
government hints at something more complicated. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE MAY 16 COUP – A GENERAL NARRATIVE 
 
 
At around 3:00 a.m. on May 16, 1961, Republic of Korea (ROK) revolutionary 
forces led by Major General Park Chung-Hee entered the capital, Seoul, and took over 
the government in a successful and relatively quiet coup d’état. In so doing, Park and his 
followers deposed the elected government of Prime Minister Chang Myon and President 
Yun Po-Sun (Yun Po-Seon). As is typical for coups, this one was accomplished with a 
tiny number of participants, less than one percent of the ROK’s standing army of near 
600,000 soldiers. Despite massively outnumbering the revolutionaries, the ROK military 
did not take any significant action against them. With the exception of a brief exchange 
of fire between revolutionary ROK Marines and opposing ROK Military Police, the 
entire event was bloodless and received little reaction from the public.99 The United 
States, which had tens of thousands of its own troops station in the country and whose 
highest ranking officer also held military authority over the ROK military, was equally 
silent. With the exception of one statement by Commander-in-Chief of UN Forces 
General Magruder and another by the U.S. Embassy’s chargé d’affaires Marshall Green 
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declaring support for the Chang government—both of which the State Department later 
distanced themselves from—the United States forces in Korea did little to actively 
prevent or influence the coup. This was in spite of the fact that CIA had uncovered details 
of the coup plans in the previous month. 
By 5:00 a.m., coup forces took control of the Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) 
radio station and broadcasted a declaration of the success of the coup and that all 
branches of government had been taken over. A ruling junta was quickly formed and 
declared an intention to build up the economic and social well-being of the nation, and 
root out corruption and greed in government and business, with an end goal of returning 
to civilian rule once significant progress had been made. Though Park Chung-Hee was 
the apparent leader of the coup, he ended up as the junta’s second in command, under 
Lieutenant General Chang Do-Young (Jang Do-Yeong) the former Army Chief of Staff 
for the toppled regime. Through a series of factional conflicts that saw many junta 
members removed from their positions, or even jailed, Park Chung-Hee rose to the top 
and became the de facto ruler of the nation. When President Yun Po-Sun resigned in 
protest of some of the junta’s policies and actions, Park Chung-Hee became acting 
president. He was publicly elected president in 1963, and would continue as president 
until his assassination in 1979. 
Despite being a critical point in Korean history, and despite Park Chung-Hee’s 
popularity as a historical topic in other areas, the coup is rarely detailed in the English 
literature. The most focused and significant work is the essay by Yong-Sup Han (Han 
Yong-Seop) entitled “The May Sixteenth Military Coup,” which was published in the 
collection of essays The Park Chung Hee Era. Han’s analysis is largely conventional, and 
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primarily relies on a single main source: Cho Gap-Je’s multi-volume biography of Park 
entitled Spit on My Grave. Unfortunately, Han does not reference the primary record in 
support of the narrative he describes. His essay can be viewed as representative of 
conventional and long-standing views on this period. This conventional view holds that 
Park was almost solely responsible for planning and launching the coup, that he used 
others to achieve his ends, that ultimate power was fully in his sight from the beginning, 
and that he manipulated factions in the junta and the people of the nation to lift himself 
there. For example, Han argues that the issues of the coup were “Park's political tasks, 
ranging from those of coup planning, to the actual launching of military intervention, to 
the post-coup consolidation of power.”100 Likewise, Han ultimately lays the coup and its 
aftereffects at the feet of “Park's ambition.”101 However, ascribing everything to Park and 
his will obscures the influence and agency of the other historical actors involved. 
Moreover, there is increasing evidence that Park may have not been the architect of the 
coup after all, and that his rise was not self-actuated. It is dubious to suggest that one 
person could ever be so completely in control of every facet of a ruling faction, or worse, 
competing factions. An analysis of the historical record, both newly available documents 
and others like the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series that have 
previously been available, raises several questions that need to be reexamined in relation 
to Park’s coup and ultimate rise to power.  
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Background and Lead-up to the Coup 
 
 
 
The seeds for Park’s revolution were sown many years before his group took 
action. The government in Korea was largely dysfunctional since the country’s liberation 
from Japan more than 15 years earlier. Much of that was a legacy of colonialism. 
Additionally, the Rhee regime had become notorious for corruption and using force 
against its opponents. A rigged election in 1960 led to what is known as the “April 19 
Student Movement” or the “April Student Revolution,” a popular uprising led by students 
and labor groups that eventually forced Rhee to resign. As noted in previous chapters, 
Park claimed to have seen the corruption of the Rhee regime as an extension of the 
corruption and factionalism prevalent in pre-modern Korea, particularly the Joseon 
Dynasty.  
Kim Jong-Pil, Park’s chief co-conspirator in the coup, was particularly focused on 
corruption in the military at this time. In recent interviews, Kim remembered that “many 
agreed that ranking military officials responsible for the rigged March 15 general 
elections in 1960, which angered so many and led to nationwide street protests, should 
resign from their positions.”102 Eventually Kim, along with 15 of his peers, led an open 
campaign demanding the dismissal of these officials. The result was that “for 11 days 
between Feb. 4 and Feb. 15, [Kim] was locked up in a military prison on charges of 
mutiny.” Kim wanted to bring his case to trial as a means to present the issue publicly, 
but was forced to resign when then Army Chief of Staff Song Yo-Chan threatened to 
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attack Park Chung-Hee for being a Communist.103 Park, who shared Kim’s desire to 
remove corrupt officials from the military, became an enemy of Song when he sent the 
man a letter suggesting Song should “resign to take responsibility for the military’s 
intervention in the March 15 election.”104 
Park’s conflict with Song Yo-Chan is further detailed by an incident that 
journalist Kim Chong-Shin recalled in his book, Seven Years with Korea’s Park Chung 
Hee. The book was published in 1967, only a few years after the events in question. At 
the time, Park was a two-star general and the commander of the logistics command in 
Busan. Song made an official visit to the city, in reality a thinly-veiled operation to “win 
or force the loyalties of his subordinate generals and officers in the port city to pave the 
way for the re-election of President Syngman Rhee.” Park arranged a dinner party for 
Song, the man’s entourage, and the press, at a Japanese-style restaurant downtown. 
During the dinner, the election rigging operation was discussed, referred to as “the great 
event.” Kim Chong-Shin recalled that “[i]t was at the mention of ‘the great event’ that I 
overheard General Park blurt out: ‘You Rascal!’ What an unexpected thing to hear from a 
man like him.”105 Song returned to Busan five days before the election to push what Kim 
referred to as “Operation Pigeon,” a CIC [Counter-Intelligence Command] plan 
“designed to insure 90 percent of the military votes for the pro-government 
candidates.”106 Park “refused to cooperate” with the plans, but besides arguing with some 
other officers about it and refusing to actively encourage his own subordinates to get 
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involved, Park did nothing in direct opposition.107 But his stubborn refusal to participate 
in the military leadership’s plans ended up making Park an enemy of Song and other 
senior officers. It is in this context of professional animosity that Park eventually sent the 
letter to Song. 
The Rhee regime was replaced with a new form of parliamentary government that 
weakened the power of the president and established a prime minister as the dominant 
executive. The man elected to be prime minister was Chang Myon. In Our Nation’s Path, 
Park recollects that there was a wait-and-see approach amongst some of his peers to this 
new government. He wrote that “sensible young officers had hoped, after the Student 
Revolution of April 1960, that a competent government would be established and 
democracy in Korea would be genuinely reconstructed.”108 Park suggested that 
“immediately following the April Revolution, the Democrats [Chang’s party] should 
have launched a new life movement on a national scale and should have wiped out 
corruption and old evils.”109 But Park did not think the Chang government succeeded at 
this in the least bit. He suggested,  
On the contrary, however, the Party disengaged itself from the people and stood 
isolated from the very moment of its assumption of power. Some Democrats 
themselves had been part of the former rotten ruling class—pre-modern relics 
                                                          
107 Kim Chong-Shin had a relatively close relationship with Park, following the man’s career in Busan and 
being present in official capacity during many incidents. Kim describes an argument he witnessed between 
Park and a certain Colonel P as follows: “General Park lifted his face resolutely to the insolent colonel. 
‘Don’t ask me anymore,’ he said. ‘How on earth can I do such a thing? It is my duty to tell my officers and 
men to do the right things. Then how should I encourage them to be involved in the rigged election?’ Then 
he looked straight into the eyes of the colonel. Colonel P straightened his position to attention, perhaps 
because he was intimidated by the stern gaze of General Park. ’What is the use of holding the election? I 
don’t care whatever you do about it!’ The general’s voice became even colder and graver. It was not loud, 
but it was fierce enough, I thought, to crush even a rock. General Park’s gaze remained for a moment on the 
colonel’s face. Then suddenly he went to his table to grasp a bundle of ballot papers. He tore them into 
pieces and threw them into the oil stove” (Kim, 29). 
108 Park, Chung Hee, Our Nation’s Path (Seoul: Dong-A Publishing Company, 1964): 197. 
109 Ibid., 195.  
51  
drunk with idleness and surfeited with ill-gotten gains. Blinded by the minor 
politics of begging and buying votes, they were too stupid and indifferent to 
understand the pressing need to enlighten the people and open a nation-wide 
movement to reconstruct society . . . It was impossible for us to tolerate the 
Democrats’ prolongation of the Liberals’ [Rhee’s party] corruption. A brief 
alteration of the façade of democracy was preferable to the total demolition of the 
shattered framework of democracy itself.110  
 
Even before the end of the Rhee regime, Park and his peers had become discontent. The 
lack of results from the Chang regime seems to have pushed them over the edge. 
From its beginning, the Chang government was plagued with problems. As noted 
in a United States Special National Intelligence Estimate, Chang became Prime Minister 
“only after Kim To-Yon (Gim Do-Yeon), a fellow Democrat, had been nominated but 
rejected by a very narrow margin. The faction led by Kim finally broke away completely, 
formed the New Democratic Party, and [was] the major opposition.”111 Additionally, 
there were splits in Chang’s own party, as a significant group of “25-30 younger men” 
believed “Chang’s leadership [was] not sufficiently imaginative or vigorous.”112 This 
seemed to be, for Park, evidence of the same kind of factionalism he saw as the bane to 
Korean democracy in the past. 
In addition to factionalism, the same document noted that “police terrorism and 
press censorship have been eliminated, but little real progress has been made in the past 
year on the basic social and economic problems with confront the ROK government and 
people.”113 The report also noted “the opposition in Parliament is backed by a substantial 
segment of the press which has taken advantage of the new freedom from censorship to 
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indulge in generally antigovernment, often irresponsible journalism.”114 Factionalism, 
lack of economic progress, irresponsible journalism—these were all fundamental 
problems in Park’s eyes, at least according to his writings.  
A report by Hugh D. Farley of the International Cooperation Administration went 
even further. Farley suggested that “the whole fabric of Korean life was shot through 
with graft, corruption and fraud” in part because of an “absence of a U.S. posture on 
integrity.” He suggested that the “economic and social phase of the April 1960 unfinished 
revolution [was] still to be initiated [and that] the Government [was] increasingly 
powerless to take the necessary actions because of its involvement in corruption.” 
Ultimately, he prophesized “an explosion of popular discontent on April 19,” which 
would be the first anniversary of the movement that toppled Rhee.115 In a telegram to the 
Embassy in Korea, the U.S. Department of State was of the opinion that it was “very 
dubious” for Korea to remain free  
so long as ROK lacks forceful leadership, exhibits serious weakness in moral 
fiber, and permits graft and corruption on a scale equaling if not excelling that 
during the moral nadir of Rhee regime. Evidence is clear that youth and 
intelligentsia [of] most Asian countries are in no mood in [the] latter 20th Century 
to continue stomaching “typically Asian” accommodation to graft, nepotism and 
apathy of past centuries; and history has shown that they are more ready to accept 
the high costs in human values exacted by Communism (even when these are 
understood fully, and all the more when they are not) then we tend to find credible 
before the fact. When sufficiently revolted by apathetic drifting and by illegal 
gains for the elite, the totalitarian aspects of Communism appear less fearsome 
and its austerity and determined purposes may become positively attractive, in the 
hunger for national material progress leading, they hope, to national dignity at 
last.116 
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In the months leading up to the coup, some elements in the U.S. Government, including 
the CIA and State Department, seemed to have seen it coming. They saw the public 
discontent with the corrupt government, and they saw a reality where people were willing 
to accept totalitarianism as a means to national development. Indeed, democracy was not 
an ingrained, essential institution in this or many other countries recovering from 
colonialism.  
It was in this context that Park and his peers began considering what they called a 
“revolution.” The common scholarship has Park leading a coalition as early as the final 
months of 1960. The best model of this argument is in Yong-Sup Han’s essay. Han has so 
far provided the most detailed narrative of the lead-up and execution of the coup in the 
English literature. However, Han’s account seems to make many unsupported 
assumptions and is severely lacking in evidence, with almost no references to the primary 
record. Regarding the pre-coup timeline, Han suggests, 
From November 1960 until May 1961, Park focused on persuading more generals 
in command of combat and noncombat troops on the front lines with North Korea 
as well as in the rear area to join the coup coalition. . . . With the goal of 
preventing a crackdown on the organization of the coup, which by then had 
become an open secret, Park tried to persuade officers at the Counter-Intelligence 
Command to sign on. To equip his coup coalition with guns and tanks, Park also 
tried to win over the army's Ninth Division, the major armored division located in 
the vicinity of Seoul. Both efforts failed, however. But to the relief of the coup 
makers, neither the Counter-Intelligence Command nor the Ninth Division 
reported the conspiracy to higher authorities. Toward the end of 1960, Park began 
other talks parallel to the ongoing meetings with the core group, in order to 
broaden his support base among younger officers. He purposely put himself in the 
position of coordinating activities of the different segments of the coalition. The 
participants communicated and coordinated only through Park, making him the de 
facto leader. The loose network gave Park freedom to maneuver and flexibility to 
adjust swiftly to changes in the political environment. Once the coup succeeded in 
May 1961, the same structure—with a built-in system of checks and balances 
among the mid-ranking core members and between the colonels and the generals 
and with the hub occupied by Park—would be of great assistance to Park in 
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consolidating power around him.117 
 
None of the above passage is supported by any evidence or citation, nor does the author 
cite primary sources for any of the other claims made in the surrounding pages. It is 
therefore not clear how Han knows exactly what Park “focused on”, what his “goal” was 
in his supposed recruitment drives, or what actions he “purposefully” took in such cases. 
It is not clear where this narrative is ultimately derived from.  
Moreover, this narrative runs contrary to common sense in several places. Why 
wouldn’t the CIC report Park’s coup plans at this point? They did, in fact, report him in 
response to a later leak. The Korean military at the time was quite competitive and even 
predatory. It is hard to accept without evidence that other officers would not use this 
information to their advantage by knocking Park down to raise themselves up. Indeed, by 
mid-1960 Park had made enemies of several senior generals. And how would Park know 
what sort of post-coup command and control structure he would need if he had no prior 
experience in politics or revolution? The assumptions made here appear to have been 
extrapolated retroactively from details of Park’s later leadership as evidence of his skill at 
setting up the junta, his first major political act. Supporting evidence is quite dangerously 
lacking. In another section Han goes so far as to argue that the planning, with Park in the 
lead, started as early as May of 1960.118  All of this contradicts Kim Jong-Pil's recent 
statements, which are supported by evidence in the primary record.  The copious 
evidence of Park’s unimpressive background and lack of clear power during in the early 
days of the junta calls Han's account into question. 
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According to Kim Jong-Pil, in May of 1960 Park was still working within the 
system to attack corruption, which was when he sent the letter to Chief of Staff Song 
asking for the man’s resignation.119 Kim claims that in 1960 Park was still focused on 
reformation of the military and was waiting to see “who would be appointed by the 
Chang Myon administration to take the military’s highest position.”120 He had a 
conversation with Park on June 9th to discuss this issue in which he claims to have 
whispered to Park, “If we can’t make that happen, then we should resort to revolution.”121 
This corroborates the wait-and-see attitude Park mentioned in his own writing. If the 
military appointments mentioned by Kim didn’t come until after that conversation with 
Park, and if we take his narrative as genuine, planning could not have begun in May 1960.  
Yong-Sup Han’s timeline, based primarily on Cho Gap-Je’s biography of Park 
and representative of the conventional narrative, seems to be incorrect, whereas the 
timeline described by Kim Jong-Pil seems to be much more accurate. In an environment 
where each military officer or government official was leveraging every corrupt 
advantage to get ahead, a secret as significant as coup plans could not have been 
concealed for long. “It was on April 7, 1961," remembers Kim, "that Park appeared 
before the officers and declared that he would lead the coup.”122 This is contrary to Han’s 
narrative, which has Park himself leading secret meetings with officers, many months in 
advance of the coup. Han even references Cho Gap-Je’s account to suggest that “Park 
may have thought of the coup when he was under General Yi Yong-Mun as early as 
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1952.”123 This is exceedingly unlikely. The Korean War was still being fought, so Park 
would not have contemplated a coup at the time. Not only was his military career set on a 
fast track because of the war, but the conditions of post-war corruption and economic 
failure that motivated the coup were absent. 
Citing the same source, Han also suggests “[w]hen Park Chung-Hee was assigned 
to the post of commander of logistics in [B]usan, he discussed the coup with his 
colleagues . . . after observing the government’s illegal election campaign on March 15, 
1960.”124 This is also unlikely given that Park’s reluctance to endorse the military 
leadership’s rigging of the election had made him several high-ranking enemies; enemies 
that were not only monitoring him, but looking for any way to take him down. Kim 
Chong-Shin noted, 
The military leaders of the interim government employed every imaginable means 
to win General Park’s loyalty, with only frustrating results. They met almost 
every day to find an effective solution to the ticklish problem, yet they could 
neither leave the question unanswered nor invent a plausible excuse to downgrade 
the general. Their final conclusion was to bury him in obscurity step by step.125  
 
It is evident from the many conflicts with the primary record that a serious analysis of 
Cho Gap-Je’s work, his sources, and evidence is needed, although that lies beyond the 
scope of this paper.  Regardless, basing one's arguments solely on such a seemingly 
flawed secondary source is risky. These arguments for an extended coup planning 
timeline don’t seem to fit the available primary evidence. 
Kim Jong-Pil’s new account aligns better with the primary record. The CIA had 
detected the plan in April and even the ROK military and government were aware of it. 
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Various CIA reports from April 1961 noted details of the plan: 
One of two existing coups to overthrow ROK Government is led by Major 
General [Park Chung-Hee], Deputy Commanding General, Second ROK 
Army. . . . Plans discussed throughout ROK Army down to and including 
division commanders. . . . on possibility of a military coup. Definite threat 
exists . . . . The plot is supported by ROK Army, student groups and reformists. 
Leader believed to be General [Park Chung-Hee], . . . Chang [Do-Young, Army 
Chief of Staff] desires arrest [Park Chung-Hee] but has lack of evidence. 
Believes arrest might trigger coup. . . .ROK Army CIC is investigating the 
coup. . . . had one-hour meeting with ROK Army Chief of Staff Chang Do-
Young on 24 April . . . Chang mentioned that [Park] had talked to him one week 
earlier. Chang states that he believes no action imminent. . . . Prime Minister 
Chang Myon is aware of rumors circulating to the effect that a group of 
malcontents within the Army may be plotting some kind of coup. He attaches 
little importance to these stories and believes that the situation is by no means 
dangerous.126 
 
The CIA’s report not only fits the leaky political climate of the time, but also aligns with 
Kim Jong-Pil’s recollections. Kim stated that on April 10 he handed documents 
containing the coup plan to Park Chung-Hee, and the latter decided to show them to then 
Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Chang Do-Young. Kim resisted the idea but 
noted  
Park had deep trust in Chang after years of friendship. . . . It was Chang who 
reinstated Park as a major in 1950 and helped Park have a smooth ride in his 
military career. . . . In my judgment, it wasn’t clear whether Chang would stand 
with us. He could simply turn our plans over to the authority and get us all 
busted. . . . That day, Park visited Chang and gave him the plan.127  
 
This aligns with the time given for the meeting between Chang and Park in the CIA 
reports. Kim’s suspicion of Chang proved accurate, since Chang was not only motivated 
to arrest Park, but also openly opposed the coup at its onset, requesting military aid from 
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General Magruder and the UN Command to put it down.128  Chang may have even 
ordered his men to fire on Park specifically.129  
In fact, Park was quite open about his plans. Not only did he talk to Chang Do-
Young about it, he revealed it to several others. Kim Chong-Shin notes that a week 
before the coup, Park talked to Hwang Yong-Ju, who was then the Editor-in-Chief of the 
Busan Ilbo. Park was looking for people to provide operational funds, and sought the 
advice of Hwang, his old classmate. The pair then revealed the plan to a flour mill owner, 
who offered financial backing for the plan. According to Kim, the plan was then leaked 
to Prime Minister Chang Myon by an unidentified person. Chang ordered his Prosecutor 
General to execute an arrest on the day before the coup.130  
This wasn’t even first time that someone involved in the coup plan had revealed 
the plot. Kim Jong-Pil recalled that in late April or early May another leak “was made 
inadvertently by Col. Lee Jong-Tae, who was part of our group, when he spilled some 
details of the plan on a bus to a military officer sitting next to him in a bid to win him 
over. The officer tipped off the top chain of command.”131 Park and his peers proved time 
and again to be blatantly ignorant of what we would today call operational security.132 
Park also proved at times to be a poor judge of whom he could trust and how wide he 
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could safely spread his plans. It was perhaps only for Chang Do-Young’s complacency 
that the coup ever came to pass. It is difficult to imagine that any plot could have been 
kept secret for a year in such an environment, as the conventional narrative argues.133 
Kim Jong-Pil’s new account simply seems more plausible. 
All of this significantly differs from the common view; one that credits Park with 
planning and leading the coup as far as a year in advance, using his name and powers of 
manipulation to draft fellow officers directly into the fold. In fact, Kim Jong-Pil suggests 
that he did most of the recruiting, particularly among the younger colonels. More 
strikingly, Kim also suggests that it was he who approached Park with the final decision 
to start; Kim was the initiator, not Park.134  At any rate, it is clear that the both the CIA 
and ROK Army knew about Park’s coup plans almost a month before they were 
initiated.135 The coup plan had gained much momentum in the month prior to its 
execution. Part of this could be due to two failed launches that occurred around this time. 
According to Kim, the first plan was to launch the coup on April 19th, the anniversary of 
the Student Revolution, using the expected mass protests as a smokescreen. 
Unfortunately, there was little protest action on that day. The second plan was to begin on 
May 12th, but was cancelled when the plan was leaked to ROK Army command. Kim 
noted that both of these failures “turned out to help us come to a better plan.”136 And so, 
with two false starts the stage was set for the now well-telegraphed coup. 
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Execution of the Coup and the Immediate Aftermath 
 
 
 
According to the new interviews with Kim Jong-Pil, he and Park left the latter’s 
house at around 11:30 p.m. on the 15th of May in order to commence their operation. Not 
only had the coup plan been leaked twice before, but it had gotten out again that very 
night. Two counterintelligence jeeps were following Park, due to a leak from the 30th 
Reserve Division, the result of a small power struggle amongst coup supporters. The 
information passed from the division commander Lee Sang-Guk to Army Chief of Staff 
Chang Do-Young. Chang promptly ordered Park’s arrest. Thus the stage was set; it was 
impossible to delay again.137 
At around 3 a.m., 40 trucks carrying men from the ROK Sixth Artillery Corps 
approached Changgyeong Palace in Seoul. These trucks would have had to pass U.S. 
Military checkpoints on their way into the city, and seemingly did so without incident. 
The ROK Marine 1st Brigade was not as lucky. The progress of the 1,500 marines was 
briefly interrupted when they were stopped by Korean military police on the Han River 
Bridge. There was a brief exchange of fire between the two groups, but the sizable 
marine force “easily outnumbered them and broke through the defense line on the 
bridge.”138 Simultaneously, forces from the 6th Artillery Corps surrounded ROK Army 
Headquarters, with Chief of Staff Chang Do-Young still inside, and the captured KBS 
radio station to begin broadcasting the news of the coup. The purpose of these actions 
seems to have been to coerce Chang into joining the coup, after it had already started. At 
9 a.m., the coup makers broadcasted a martial law decree from the KBS station in the 
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name of General Chang, even though he had yet to agree to join the coup. Chang refused 
to make the decision without first consulting President Yun Bo-Sun.139 The president, for 
his part, told General Chang that “he [did] not desire any firm action to eliminate the 
revolutionary movement.”140 This is perhaps not surprising given the fact that Yun was a 
rival of ruling Prime Minister Chang Myon.  Around this time Yun stated that “Chang 
Myon had proven incapable of providing” the strong leadership needed in the ROK.141 
Likewise, the Minister of National Defense said “he [did] not desire that FROKA [First 
ROK Army] troops be used to put down the revolutionary movement.”142 
So it was with relative ease that the coup makers moved into power. On the day of 
the coup, they issued several decrees which had restrictive effects including “ordering 
martial law throughout the ROK, night curfew, full censorship, restricted use of airports 
and seaports, ban on travel out of Korea by Koreans, ban on public meetings, dissolution 
of the National Assembly and local councils, arrest of Cabinet Ministers and Vice 
Ministers, [and] freezing of all banking activities.”143 Many of these restrictions were 
eased in the days and weeks to follow, but not entirely. The group also broadcasted their 
political pledges, which included anti-Communism first and foremost, which may have 
been more of a political necessity to ensure continued U.S. support and to distance the 
group from rumors of Park Chung-Hee’s past than anything else. The other pledges 
included adherence to the United Nations Charter, eliminating corruption, improving the 
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livelihood of the poor and starving, and improving military effectiveness.144  
A military government was formally constituted on May 21st with General Chang 
Do-Young at its head and Yun Po-Sun returning as President.145 It had not been 
immediately clear whether Yun would return to his post as president. Both Yun and 
General Chang reacted lightly to the coup makers taking power. Yun had originally 
resigned in response to the coup, but not in an oppositional way. During his resignation 
announcement, Yun said “I believe members of the military junta will make every 
possible effort with faith and loyalty to the nation in the interest of developing the 
country and to save the people from poverty and misery.”146 For the U.S. Government, 
Yun’s return was critical to “confer on the successor government to maximum attainable 
extent and aura of legality, continuity and legitimate constitutional succession.”147 This 
was important for preserving the ROK’s “diplomatic relations with the United States and 
other countries.”148  It is significant that the U.S. Government quickly shifted its stance 
from demanding the reinstatement of the entire former government to merely having the 
Korean president, the weaker of the two ROK executives, stay on for the sake of 
formalities. The strong response from Magruder and the Embassy was never fully 
embraced by the State Department, but neither was the coup. In the end, neither Chang 
not Yun held any significant power in the junta, the latter a mere figurehead and the 
former over-powered by rival factions. As early as May 24th, the U.S. Embassy was 
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“more convinced than ever that President Yun Po-Sun was able to exercise little 
influence and almost no authority.”149 Chang was also removed from his position in the 
junta in little more than a month, pushing Park Chung-Hee to the top. 
The U.S. assessment of the junta, as described by Robert H. Johnson of the 
National Security Council in June, was that “[i]n the case of the old Chang Myon regime 
we were more confident about its good intentions than about its political capabilities. In 
the case of the new military regime we are somewhat more confident about capabilities, 
at least to initiate reform measures, and less confident of intentions.” More specifically, 
Johnson suggested that “we are faced by a tough, authoritarian, nationalistic regime 
which may be capable of overriding the political obstacles to action on Korean problems, 
but which is inexperienced, likely to be plagued by continual factionalism, and clearly 
less amenable to U.S. influence.”150  
The junta acted quickly in exercising its power. Following the emergency decrees 
on the day of the coup, the junta ordered the arrests of former military and government 
officials throughout the last weeks of May, to include “930 alleged Communists and 
2,500 ‘hoodlums.’” They also imposed strict censorship on the press and banned political 
activities.151 The junta also passed an order that people had to work weekends and 
holidays while martial law was in effect.152 In the first courts-martial imposed by the 
junta, “jail terms of up to one year for forty-seven men and women accused of having 
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danced in an unlicensed dance hall” were imposed.153 In spite of such measures, there 
was little reaction on the street as “the people of the capital went calmly about their 
business.”154 In later months the restrictions were refined and codified, such as a security 
law which targeted Communist sympathizers and people who traveled to North Korea. 
These laws were passed in conjunction with the arrest of former Prime Minister Chang 
Myon for alleged Communist collaboration. Somewhat ironically, “the Communist 
sympathizers law was almost identical with measures that Dr. Chang [Chang Myon] 
supported while he was Premier but the National Assembly failed to approve after strong 
opposition from students.”155 
But not all the policies of the junta were restrictive. Just days after coming to 
power, “the junta earmarked for relief more than $1,500,000 that was to have been used 
for expenses of the now-dissolved National Assembly” to distribute to the poor.156 The 
junta also “appointed seventy-two college professors to five advisory committees.”157 
Goodwill missions were dispatched as early as June 23rd to the Americas, South East 
Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa.158 In July, the junta set a limit of 0.2 percent on 
“the number of military officers permitted to serve in government posts.”159 In the same 
month the junta released 1,217 of 3,098 persons arrested as Communist supporters, four 
of six arrested journalists, and announced a pledge to return to civilian rule. The plan was 
announced in detail on August 12th, “promising general elections in May of 1963, and a 
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return to civilian government that summer.” Park Chung-Hee, at that time chairman of 
the junta, said that “two years was the minimum time needed to carry out the pledges 
announced by the army when it seized power in its coup last May 16.”160  
Early assessment of the junta was that “it consist[ed] of a good proportion of 
honest and dedicated men” who believed that “to survive, South Korea now need[ed] a 
period of authoritarian control.” These men were devoted “for the most part, but they 
[were] not above the struggle for power.” Compared to the Rhee regime in certain lights, 
and to Communist regimes in other countries, “the authoritarianism of the junta [was] 
fairly relaxed.”161 Additionally, it was noted with the Korean junta “there [was] no 
‘personality cult’, no great propaganda hoopla” and they were “not bound to a dogma.” 
But authoritarianism had its limits as “the junta system of government [was] cumbersome: 
too many officers have too many fingers in too many pies.”162 In short, outsiders, 
Americans in particular, were unsure of the junta but not completely put off, despite the 
authoritarian measures it imposed.  
The junta missed its self-proposed deadline for civilian elections. This was the 
result of many factors, including factionalism within the ruling collective and their 
political party, as well as demands from the military to extend military rule. The 
presidential election was held on October 15, 1963, and the results did not favor the junta. 
Park only managed to secure 47 percent of the vote compared to 45 per cent for his new 
political rival, Yun Po-Sun. At first glance it seems support for the junta, in the form of 
its political party, may have weakened substantially. Writing at the time, C.I. Eugene 
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Kim suggested, “The junta's popularity had steadily declined, primarily because of the 
failure of the financial reform program, its inability to cope with the worsening economic 
situation, and the termination of a short-lived honeymoon between the military and the 
intellectuals.”163  
However, it may be more likely that the dissatisfaction in early 1963 was with 
Park himself, who was seen as not providing the strong and clear leadership he we now 
associate with him. C.I.E. Kim argued after the official launch of the junta’s new political 
party, the Democratic Republican Party, that “[a] serious power struggle ensued within 
the junta itself. During this crisis, General Park demonstrated a tendency towards 
vacillation which often irritated even his supporters.”164 Further evidence supporting such 
a conclusion was that in the elections for the national assembly that followed, Park’s 
party won 110 seats, of a total 175, in the National Assembly.165 If the vote was clean, 
which it seems to have been, at least in comparison to previous elections, then the party 
representing the junta appears to have had much more general support than Park himself. 
But regardless, Park ended up as president and stayed there for eighteen more years. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
KEY QUESTIONS REGARDING PARK’S POWER AND AGENCY 
 
 
It is largely for granted that Park Chung-Hee was ultimately responsible for 
planning and executing the coup, for developing and leading the military junta that 
followed, and for directly acting to keep himself in power.166 Park is the sole power-
holder, his invisible hand ultimately controlling everything. Such a view is probably too 
simple to be accurate, particularly in reference to the coup and junta period.  It seems 
instead that Park’s power and control increased over time, particularly after he was 
elected president. During the coup and junta period, power was very much in flux. There 
is evidence that suggests that Park may have not been behind most of the major moves 
during this period. This chapter will examine the limits of Park’s power during the junta 
period and confront the “absolute power” narrative by examining four key questions: 1) 
Is Park’s pre-junta biography consistent with the idea of him as an independent and 
dominating leader? 2) Was Park the main architect of the coup? 3) What were the limits 
of Park’s power and influence during the junta period? 4) Did Park plan to stay in power 
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after the junta period? 
 
Is Park’s pre-junta biography consistent with the idea of him as an independent  
and dominating leader? 
 
  
 
A critical new piece of scholarship, released in recent years, casts doubt on the 
premise that Park was always an assertive leader and that his success was the result 
primarily of his own skill and willpower. In 2012, Chong-Sik Lee published a new 
biography of Park that focuses on his life before the coup. Lee supports his work with 
substantial primary and secondary evidence and shows, perhaps inadvertently, that there 
were several periods where Park’s path in life and success were influenced by others. 
Park’s views of Korean history and politics were influenced, at least in part, from 
his father. According to Lee, Park’s father “may have been a yangban (Korean 
aristocratic class), but he was marginalized, frustrated, and indignant at the corruption 
and injustice that surrounded him.”167 Park’s father was involved in the failed Tonghak 
Rebellion and was arrested. Lee notes that though Park’s grandfather had inherited 
enough land to care for his family, his father’s failure to find a place in Joseon society, 
due to rampant factionalism and corruption, and the man’s failed political actions, 
brought the family into poverty.168 He also states that “Park Chung-Hee once said that 
poverty was both his teacher and his benefactor.”169 It should be noted that Park’s later 
political trajectory mirrored his father’s—being “marginalized” in the Army, “frustrated” 
by corruption, and ultimately resolved towards revolution. It is also not a coincidence that 
                                                          
167 Lee, Chong-sik, Park Chung-Hee: From Poverty to Power [Kindle Edtion] (Palos Verdes: The KHU 
Press, 2012): Kindle Locations 385-386. 
168 Ibid., Kindle Locations 223-249. 
169 Ibid., Location 223. 
69  
Park prioritized fighting poverty as the key to his revolution. 
Despite coming from an impoverished background, with no guarantee to receive 
formal schooling, Park graduated from Kumi Elementary at the top of his class and 
“enrolled as fifty-first among the 1,070 applicants” to Taegu Normal School, which 
trained elementary school teachers.170 However, unlike his success at elementary school, 
Park’s performance at Taegu Normal School got progressively worse over the years. Lee 
attributes this to his family’s poverty; these issues included not having money to pay for 
food to share with classmates according to custom, to pay for field trips, or even to pay 
for the train to go to school. Lee notes that “Park Chung-Hee’s class ranking at Taegu 
Normal School being sixty-nine out of seventy, it was unlikely that the authorities would 
assign him [as a teacher] to a top elementary school. He was lucky that he got a teaching 
post at all.”171 At this point, Park’s success was out of largely out his hands and was left 
up to the authorities over him. He certainly did not demonstrate the knack for overcoming 
difficulties he is now known for.  
It was likewise through the aid of others that Park was able to enroll at the 
Manchukuo Military Academy and begin his military career. At first his application was 
rejected because he was three years past the maximum age. Yet some outside influence 
forced the academy to change its mind and accept Park. Lee attributes this to a 
recommendation from Lieutenant Colonel Arikawa Kazuichi, who was “the officer in 
charge of military education at [Taegu Normal School].” Lee notes that the two had 
“developed a close relationship” while Park was at the school.172 Lee’s argument for 
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Arikawa’s involvement is well evidenced and sound. 
One of the biggest issues in Park’s past that influenced not only his own political 
career, but also the later scholarship on Park, was his supposed Communist ties in the late 
1940s. Much of the scholarship still describes Park as a faithful and active Communist 
during this period. It is well known that Park joined the South Korean Workers Party 
after the death of his brother Sang-Hee (Sang-Hui), who was killed while leading a 
protest. However, Lee notes that “All accounts suggest that a Reverend Yi Chae-Bok (I 
Chae-Bok), a friend of Park Sang-Hee, persuaded Park Chung-Hee to join the 
Namnodang, the South Korean Workers’ Party.”173 Certainly, Park was the one who 
made the decision to join the Namnodang, but without the active recruitment of Yi, Park 
likely would not have joined. This seems to be a common occurrence in Park’s career, 
that his progression was as much the result of other people’s recruitment, as of his own 
determination. Lee suggests, 
It was Namnodang’s resistance against American forces and its call for 
progressive reforms that Park found attractive, rather than its underlying ideology. 
It is also likely that Park Chung-Hee treated the matter of joining Namnodang 
akin to his brother’s joining the People’s Party. Yi Chae-Bok could very well 
have presented Namnodang as a successor to the People’s Party, so that Park 
would essentially be following in his brother’s footsteps. Namnodang did not 
exist while Park Sang-Hee was alive; it came into being twelve days after he was 
killed. I am inclined to believe Park Chung-Hee consented to become a 
Namnodang member without attaching much importance to what Yi Chae-Bok so 
eagerly sought.174 
 
Lee argues that Park was not emotionally or personally attached to the Worker Party’s 
ideology, but rather allied with them based on vague common ideals and the legacy of his 
brother. And such detachment is evidenced by how easily Park informed on party 
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members when he was arrested by the Army. During an investigation into Worker Party 
members within the ROK Army, Park “provided the investigators with a detailed list of 
Namnodang members among army officers” in order to secure his own pardon.175  
Likewise, Park’s recovery from this potentially career ending event and his 
further rise in the Army mostly out of his direct control. If not for the Korean War and 
the severe lack of good officers, Park may have never made it back into the army.176 It 
was then Colonel Chang Do-Young who “restored Park Chung-Hee to the army.”177 
Moreover, Lee notes that “General James A. Van Fleet’s program to strengthen the ROK 
army’s combat effectiveness also contributed to Park’s promotion” as did the glowing 
evaluation of General Cornelius Ryan, allowing Park to receive extra officer training in 
the United States.  
Despite a history of relying on the thrust others for his advancement, such 
possibilities are rarely considered after Park begins his coup. Even Lee Chong-Sik falls 
into this rut of suggesting that Park was solely in control during his rise to power, 
suggesting he manipulated Chang Do-Young and influenced Yun Po-Sun to remain as 
president with the junta.178 It seems just as possible that Park’s rise to power was the 
result of the influence and agency of others pushing him up, as was often the case in 
Park’s past. 
Even after Park became a general in the Korean Army, he was more reserved and 
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apolitical than many of his peers. And despite coming into ideological conflict with his 
peers at times, his reactions were far from radical. A good example was Park’s response 
to the protests in Busan when he was martial law commander, during the student 
movement of 1960. Kim Chong-Shin wrote,  
The demonstrations on April 19 were so well-organized and massive that even 
the well-trained police and political hoodlums of the Liberal regime proved 
helpless. The only resort left for them was to proclaim nation-wide martial law 
that very afternoon. Army Chief of Staff Song Yo-Chan was appointed 
Commanding General of the Forces Enforcing the Martial Law, while General 
Park was assigned as local chief of the Enforcement Headquarters in the Busan 
area. But this turned out to be a fatal mistake by the government and Army 
leaders in the capital, who probably counted on General Park’s outspoken 
honesty and patriotism to carry out their wishes: indiscriminate suppression of 
demonstrators, students or adult citizens. General Park had no intention 
whatsoever to cooperate with the corrupt government leaders. Instead he 
believed that it was not right for him to suppress the “justifiable grievances” of 
the honest students and citizens. Following the proclamation of martial law, he 
secluded himself in the Headquarters of the Logistics Command and remained 
silent.179 
 
Throughout the book, Kim does not hide his conservative political views. Even so, what 
is important here is not the accusation of corruption, but rather Park’s response to his 
orders. Park clearly disagreed with what his superiors demanded, and he even acted 
disobediently. Park shared the opinions of the demonstrators. In fact, in a more overt act 
days later, Park addressed a group of protesters by standing on the hood of a jeep and 
saying “I can assure you that the officers and men, including myself, who have assembled 
here are on your side.”180 Even so, his immediate reaction to his orders was to seclude 
himself, and even when he took action it was limited to his immediate sphere of influence 
and did not do anything significant to affect the problem as a whole. He also didn’t make 
any direct insubordinate moves against his superiors like Kim Jong-Pil did on several 
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occasions. 
The point here is not to suggest that Park had no ambition, indeed he did. What is 
important is that he was not as successful as seems to be assumed. Park is commonly 
painted as a masterful leader, and a man capable of striving during hard times. Park’s 
early life doesn’t seem to support this. In fact, it seems Park was very poor at dealing 
with turmoil. His work at school suffered during the rough times his family endured. 
After the death of his brother, Park moved in and out of association with socialist groups 
for little apparent reason. Even as a general, Park’s response to opposition seems to have 
been quite weak. This image of Park stands in stark contrast to the idea of a master-
manipulator who flourished in the chaos of factionalism and political opposition. 
 
Was Park the architect of the coup? 
 
 
  
Established scholarship takes for granted that Park Chung-Hee developed the 
coup plan and was the absolute leader of the revolutionaries. This assumption rests on the 
results of the coup—specifically Park’s eventual rise to power—but lacks evidence 
showing Park’s actual leadership prior to that event. Nevertheless, it is so accepted that it 
rarely attracts detailed analysis even though evidence exists in the primary record that 
paints a contrary picture. 
As noted previously, Kim Jong-Pil, Park’s in-law and co-conspirator, claimed in 
recent interviews to have been the true architect of the coup. He claims to have had to 
convince Park to join the revolution, after having built a trusting relationship with Park 
since the Korean War, and being in need of someone of high rank to formally lead to 
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coup.181 Moreover, Kim claims to have been responsible for writing the original 
revolutionary declaration, the junta’s pledge to the people. Kim said,  
It was a set of promises declaring the demise of old rules and the establishment of 
new ones. . . . I was known as a good writer by many at that time. But it took me 
two days to finish the fateful declaration. . . . When Park first read the declaration 
of promises before it was printed for distribution, he read the No. 1 Priority [for 
anti-Communism] and said, “You wrote this because of me.”182  
 
Kim did not suggest that any approval from Park was necessary; he only noted that he 
wrote the pledges and prepared them for broadcast. Showing them to Park appears to 
have been a courtesy.  
The idea of Kim being the heart and mind behind the revolution finds support 
elsewhere in the primary record. A New York Times article released the day after the 
coup noted that “Korean sources said it was their impression that the organizing force 
behind the move to remove Premier Chang was a group of younger officers. They said 
General Park and Lieut. Gen. Chang Do-Young, Army Chief of Staff and ostensible head 
of the military junta, were ‘front men’ for the younger officers.”183  
The leader of the young officers mentioned here was Kim Jong-Pil. It should be 
noted that later reports in the New York Times began suggesting that Park was the 
mastermind of the coup, but these came after the junta clamped down on the press and 
established enough control to start their own messaging and propagandizing. One such 
report stated, “When the Government of Premier John M. Chang fell Tuesday, the forces 
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that really toppled it over were the dynamic energy and intelligence of General Park, it is 
now being reported.”184 It is not clear in this article who was doing the reporting, since 
the press in Korea had been completely shut down. Nor does Park’s background hint that 
he was particularly “dynamic.” As has been shown, Park’s career from early schooling to 
being promoted to general was a series of booms and busts, rather than a steady rise. It 
was the war that fueled the most significant periods of Park’s advancement in the Army. 
After the war his career began to stagnate again, as his conflicts with peers and superiors 
kept him from the best posts. 
More evidence supporting Kim in the lead over Park is the character and 
background of the two men in the years prior to the coup. Park was not well-known or 
active in politics at the time, and despite being ideologically opposed to many of his peers, 
Park kept much to himself. In fact, Kim Chong-Shin wrote of Park’s letter to Song Yo-
Chan, in which he asked the latter to retire due to connections to the Rhee election 
rigging scheme, that the “recommendation must have been based on friendly advice and 
confidence and good wishes rather than malice . . . To [Song], General Park seemed 
perhaps the last person who should have ever recommended his resignation. On the 
contrary, he might have counted on the latter to take his side in any critical 
showdown.”185 Park was seemingly so reserved that even such a courtesy letter, in the 
context of severe backlashes against Song from younger officers, came unexpectedly. 
Kim’s opinions about Park’s reputation with his peers and superiors hint at the man’s 
reserved character and apolitical behavior.  
A New York Times article written in the days following the coup noted that “[f]or 
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the last ten years or so, General Park has not been much in the public eye.”186 On the 
other hand, Kim Jong-Pil was very active politically, making significant pushes to 
remove corrupt officers from the military. In a telegram to the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff sent days after the coup, General Magruder noted that “[Kim Jong-Pil] 
was the moving spirit that activated the group of sixteen officers who waited on Chief of 
Staff General Choi Young-Hi (Choe Yeoung-Hui) to demand his resignation. . . . He was 
perhaps the foremost of the agitators whose elimination from the ROK Army I have 
sought over the past year.”187 Park Chung-Hee was barely on Magruder’s radar prior to 
the coup. A later telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Korea noted that “Park may be 
passing phenomenon [sic]” and that “Col. Kim, head of intelligence, and apparently 
second strongest man in junta.”188 Park had certainly been motivated to push corrupt 
officers from the military along with Kim Jong-Pil. But whereas Park’s method was to 
write a letter “suggesting” the Army Chief of Staff should resign, Kim’s was to lead a 
group of sixteen men to forcibly enter a superior’s office and make demands.  
But perhaps another important omission in the scholarship regarding the 
leadership of the coup is the writing of Park himself. Already the leader of the junta and 
following government when these books were published, Park certainly released them in 
part to support his authority. Thus, his attempts to cast off responsibility are difficult to 
explain as simply an act of political strategy. However his claims are supported by what 
Kim Jong-Pil has said in the new interviews. In describing the months of angry 
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discussion that led up to the revolution, Park claimed, “I risked my 40-year-old life and, 
not wasting a single minute, debated with worthy colleagues as to how the nation might 
be saved. It was towards the end of the Liberal government. . . . At last, I resolved to rise 
up, together with my revolutionary colleagues. I was not one bit excited.”189 The use of 
the word “colleagues” here is important in that it conveys a sense of equality amongst 
this group. Also, the emphasis on “debate” suggests that the planning was a group effort. 
Park also wrote, “As everyone knows, I am in a position in which my life, 
regardless of any volition on my part, is intimately intertwined with the country, the 
people and its history. I am under the weighty pressure of being leader of the 
revolution.”190 Here he suggested his rise to power was not of his “volition,” again 
concurring with Kim’s suggestion that he had to persuade Park to take and stay in power. 
But perhaps the clearest declaration by Park was this: 
From the very moment when I thought about the revolution, I did not want even 
to be the leader of the revolutionary government, let alone that of the Third 
Republic. After the completion of the revolution, therefore, I supported, though 
temporarily, a person who was higher than I in rank, as a leader of the 
government. I begged the man to stay on as the President, the head of state. As for 
rank, my position was only the third. I wished only to be an errand-boy in the rear. 
But, unexpected events took place in quick succession. This was really puzzling 
to me personally. Within the revolutionary government itself, an emergency in the 
form of a counter-revolution took place. And the man who was the President 
wanted to leave his post. Under such circumstances, I was obliged to assume my 
present position.191  
 
 It is certainly easy to dismiss Park’s writing and simply claim that he was lying about the 
situation, but that should require evidence and analysis, rather than mere presumptions 
about his character rooted in decades of political animosity. Interestingly, Park was 
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recognized as being honest and trustworthy; for example, an intelligence estimate by the 
CIA noted Park enjoyed “a reputation for effectiveness and honesty.”192 But neither 
should one simply take Park at his word, since skewing the truth would have been in his 
interest. In light of all this though, statements by Park and Kim, and documents 
describing their character, do constitute a useful body of evidence 
There is not enough evidence here to declare in absolute terms that Kim Jong-Pil 
was the true leader of the coup, though the evidence is more supportive of that conclusion 
than the opposite. However, there is enough evidence to suggest that the conventional 
narrative is not as solid its adherents would suggest. Park’s early life shows that he was 
often pushed onto certain courses by the people around him. So, too, do U.S. Government 
records and interviews with Kim Jong-Pil show that Kim was more politically active than 
Park. And Park even claims in his own writing that his rise to power was not his personal 
choice. Less sure are the claims that Park had strong ambitions for power and acted to 
keep hold of it; there is little specific evidence of that.  Perhaps Park was simply the right 
man for the job, a “moderating influence among the young enthusiasts who now lead the 
Republic,” as noted in a briefing book for President Kennedy, prepared for his meeting 
with Park.193 Park was a high ranked, politically moderate leader under whom the more 
politically active younger colonels could rally. The influence of these younger officers, 
particularly that of Kim Jong-Pil, should not be ignored.  
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What were the limits of Park’s power during the junta period? 
 
 
 
The shifting government structure and power fluctuations during the junta period 
(1961-1963) are an important and weakly covered aspect of the “Park era.” It was this 
period that saw Park Chung-Hee rise to the seat of power in final and absolute terms, 
affecting everything in the decades to follow. The coverage of this period is limited, 
particularly in terms of power-wielding, and especially in English publications. This 
period, like most of the “Park era,” is often viewed through a restricted lens of economics, 
looking at how the junta established its economic policies, first failures such as the 
flawed currency reform measures of 1962, then the successes that would lead to 
miraculous growth.194 In the few cases where the period is given significant discussion, 
arguments rely on several flawed presuppositions.  
First, the general narrative presupposes that from the very start of the coup, Park 
was in full control, manipulating people and factions to seize and keep power. According 
to Joo Hong-Kim, “Park knew that he had to use military factional rivalries to his 
personal advantage if he was to keep a tight rein on them. By doing so, he politicized the 
South Korean armed forces even more. He was a master of factional struggles and palace 
intrigues.”195 It is not clear how this author could be certain what Park “knew” about 
these issues. Yong-Sup Han reiterates the sentiment when he suggests “the success of the 
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coup owed much to Park's ability to quell and control factionalism within the military.”196 
However, neither source provides sufficient evidence of specific intent to solidify power, 
Park’s agency in the factionalism, or a clear mechanism by which Park might control that 
factionalism as suggested. It seems taken for granted that since Park was the boss and 
since factionalism never spilled over, Park must have been responsible for containing it. 
Park’s hand at “purging” other members of the junta is assumed rather than proven. 
A second flaw in the conventional narrative is that it automatically ascribes 
nefarious motives to every shift in power and position; scenarios in which a naïve ruling 
coalition struggles to root itself get no consideration. The claims of counter-revolutionary, 
anti-government actions used as justification for arresting junta members appear as little 
more than pretense for purges rather than legitimate judicial actions. Certainly history has 
provided examples of authoritarian governments acting as such, but precedent is not 
evidence. And even if nefarious motives ruled the day, how is it that only Park—and 
none of his junta rivals—harbored them?  Likewise, there is little room allowed for the 
idea that purges could have simply stemmed from factions fighting amongst themselves, 
without Park's involvement. 
This simplistic view of the power struggles in the junta is contradicted by 
evidence in the primary record. Park’s background doesn’t seem to show much apparent 
talent for manipulating and controlling people, beyond that of any other generic military 
officer. Certainly his time in power and his experience surviving the factionalism of the 
junta would have given him such skills to be applied later on, but they would not have 
been available during the period in question. It is worth questioning, why would someone 
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like Park, who professed such strong views about how factionalism destroyed his country, 
want to inflame factionalism in his own government after taking power? Park claims to 
have taken to revolution in order to end factionalism, not reinforce it. The more radical 
members of the military were often at odds with the moderate stances of the junta and 
thus generated factionalist tendencies on their own. Finally, such arguments are flawed in 
accepting in certain terms and without real proof the idea Park planned to be in power 
rather than being thrust into it. Primary evidence indicates that Park’s moderate politics 
and disconnection from the major factions made him the perfect candidate to rule the 
junta, whether he wanted to or not. 
In order to address these issues in the conventional description of Park’s power 
during the junta period, this section will reexamine the power fluctuations of the junta by 
analyzing the primary record. The aim is to show the limits of Park’s power to 
manipulate the junta or to otherwise do as he pleased, as well as to highlight other actors 
whose agency was critical during this period. To do so, this section will examine several 
different aspects. First is an examination of two important relationships, between Park 
and Chang Do-Young, and between Park and Kim Jong-Pil. The conventional narrative 
suggests that these two were subordinated and controlled by Park for his own gain. The 
primary record suggests a much more complicated relationship between the three. 
Secondly, this section will examine several other cases which highlight the general limits 
of Park’s power in the junta.  
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Park and Chang Do-Young 
 
 
 
One relationship that seems to be portrayed incorrectly in the scholarship is that 
of Park and Chang Do-Young. Chang was the ROK Army Chief of Staff at the time of 
the coup, and a supporter of Chang Myon. It is true that the revolutionaries likely needed 
Chang’s backing in order to gain support for their coup, specifically from the rest of the 
military. Chang was, after all, the top leader of the Army. But Chang is often portrayed as 
being simply manipulated by Park into joining the junta and being purged by Park 
months later only for the sake of strengthening the latter’s hold on power. A strong 
example of this is when Yong-Sup Han suggests,   
[Park] chose the strategy of reaching down into the ranks of colonels and 
lieutenant colonels as a support base and then working up the ladders of the 
hierarchy within the coalition in two steps, first recruiting Chang [Do-Young] and 
other senior generals to positions of top leadership to legitimize the coup, and 
then purging them, deeming them forces of counterrevolution, to clear the way to 
the top for himself.197 
 
This passage portrays Park as the sole agent, drawing in followers through his own will, 
then removing them as he pleased, for the sake of his own advancement. Such statements 
negate Chang’s agency, and ignore the complex factional contexts in which the purges 
occurred. Evidence in the primary record suggests that Chang was a more active and 
powerful agent during these events than this type of scholarship suggests.  
The adherents of the common narrative argue that Chang Do-Young implicitly 
approved the coup in collusion with Park Chung-Hee. For example, Yong-Sup Han 
asserts that during a meeting on April 10, when Park revealed his coup plan to Chang, 
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that  
The army chief of staff turned down Park's request to head the coalition, but he 
did not report the conspiracy to Prime Minister Chang Myon. Nor did he move to 
preempt the coup by ordering the Counter-Intelligence Command and the Security 
Command to arrest the conspirators. Moreover, although Chang turned down the 
leadership position, Park came out of the meeting with the impression that Chang 
had given tacit support for the coup, through elusive gestures and equivocal 
expressions. Perhaps the two miscommunicated, but it is more likely that the army 
chief of staff could see that the coup planners had already developed too much 
momentum for him to stop them. Besides, he could later side with Park if the 
coup looked promising.198  
 
However, this narrative is not supported with any primary evidence, nor with proof that 
the author knew which “impressions” Park held at the time, and it holds many flaws that 
the primary record seems to directly contradict.  
As was previously noted, Chang and the CIC did, in fact, oppose Park at the onset 
of the coup. Prior to that, a CIA report on April 24th noted that Chang wanted to arrest 
Park but did not have enough evidence to do so. Another report on April 25th noted that 
the Counter-Intelligence Command, or CIC, was indeed investigating the coup, 
anticipating an attempt on April 26th. Chang Do-Young stated to U.S. officials that he 
didn’t believe any action was “imminent.” This is likely why he did not inform Prime 
Minister Chang Myon; he did not expect Park to take any real action. Chang Do-Young 
was trusted by Chang Myon. Their relationship was strong enough that the latter planned 
to retain the general as chief of staff for a further two years.199 If Chang Do-Young cared 
about power, he had a much more stable position and potential for gain by staying loyal 
to the prime minister than by joining a risky coup attempt. This is why his failure to 
report the conspiracy to Chang Myon was more likely an honest mistake, a misjudgment 
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of the resolve of the coup makers.  
The above episode is another that supports the idea that Park was not the leading 
force behind the coup, but rather it was Kim Jong-Pil. Park and Kim had differing 
opinions about Chang Do-Young. Kim did not trust Chang whereas Park not only trusted 
him, but had benefited from his acquaintance. As previously mentioned, Chang was the 
one who reinstated Park as a military officer during the Korean War. Park’s arrest for 
suspected Communist activities had forced him out of the Army years prior. After getting 
him reinstated, Chang “helped Park have a smooth ride in his military career.”200 It is 
likely that it was his trust and subordination to Chang that led Park to present the coup 
plan to the man on April 10th. It is also probable, for the same reason, that Chang didn’t 
take him seriously or at least was reluctant to take immediate action against him.  
The concept of subordination here seems important. Not only did this relationship 
exist in a cultural context that placed high emphasis on rank and position, but also one 
where Chang had been Park’s trusted superior and patron for a long time. Park’s 
background was that of a man who respected hierarchy and demanded respect for 
authority. Kim Chong-Shin later observed that “Park’s insistence on undisputed 
obedience by his subordinates, government workers and party members alike, [had] been 
derived from his past career as a professional soldier.”201 This was probably not an 
attitude that Park adopted after coming to power, but as Kim suggests, one impressed 
upon him since his early days in the military. It is not unreasonable to expect that Park 
held himself to a similar standard when he was a junior officer, especially in light of the 
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dearth of proof that he thought otherwise. What evidence we do have is his behavior, 
which even up to his final rise to power, evinces an adherence to hierarchy. Extremism 
and disregard for rank was clearly demonstrated by Kim Jong-Pil, not Park Chung-Hee. It 
is not clear whether Chang Do-Young was aware of Kim’s involvement in the coup. Such 
lack of awareness would also help to explain his weak reaction.  
More importantly, claims that Chang Do-Young willingly let the coup pass, gave 
it his approval, or believed that the coup had “too much momentum” to stop are 
problematic in light of the fact that Chang did try to stop the coup.  On the onset of the 
coup, Chang asked General Magruder for American military support in the form of 
Military Police forces to confront the rebelling ROK marines.202 Then, when Chang 
failed to get U.S. military aid, he dispatched his own MPs to stop the marines' advance at 
the Han River Bridge. He then supposedly ordered his men to open fire on the rebels, 
fully aware that Park Chung-Hee was present with them.203 Chang clearly had no 
intention of supporting the coup, or Park, at the beginning. It is not until enemy forces 
surrounded Chang and his command that he finally acquiesced, and only after significant 
conditions had been met. Chang demanded to consult with President Yun Po-Sun first. 
President Yun, a political rival of Chang Myon, eventually accepted the coup, as did 
Chang.204 It is more likely that Chang was coerced into joining the junta by the thousand 
troops that surrounded his headquarters than by his own personal acceptance of it. The 
day following the coup, as the threat of a counterattack by the First ROK Army led by 
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Lee Han-Rim (I Han-Rim) grew, Chang Do-Young “remained ambivalent,” maintaining 
a “wait-and-see attitude.”205 But once Lee Han-Rim was arrested, President Yun was on 
board, Chang Myon and his cabinet were in hiding, and the coup makers had successfully 
taken Seoul and other cities, Chang Do-Young had little to gain by holding on to his 
loyalty to Chang Myon. Thus he finally “declared his support for the revolution.”206 
While Park Chung-Hee clearly saw that Chang’s involvement as the leader of the 
junta was essential to the legitimacy of the revolution, much in the same way Kim Jong-
Pil viewed Park, Chang was no mere pawn. In joining the junta, he had indeed acted of 
his own accord. Chang obviously had his own ideas about what he was doing and why.  
Chang had risen to the highest post in the Army, so he clearly had some sense of 
military politics, and of how to take power and keep it. A CIA report attributed Chang’s 
prior ambivalence during the first days of the coup to the possibility that he “may [have 
been] playing both sides of the fence in an effort to assure his position whatever the 
outcome.”207 Once in a position of power within the junta, Chang attempted to create a 
power base for himself. Within a week of the coup, a factional split appeared in the junta  
between a moderate group led by Lieutenant General Chang Do-Young . . . and a 
larger group led by Park and Marine Corps Commandant Kim Yun-Kun (Gim 
Yun-Kun). . . . There are reports of dissatisfaction among army colonels who, 
along with General Park, planned and executed the coup but who were 
subsequently denied cabinet posts in favor of general officers who joined the 
revolt belatedly.208 
 
 By June 15th, voting patterns within the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction 
(SCNR) seemed to “reveal three primary groupings, with most junior officers looking to 
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Lt. Col. Kim Jong-Pil for leadership. . . . As SCNR members are presently identified, 
Park is supported by 15, Kim by 10, and the SCNR chairman Lt. Gen. Chang Do-Young 
by 5.”209 Not only does this suggest that Park and Kim represented different factions in 
the junta, but it shows that Chang had his own power base even though it was the 
smallest. It then makes sense that Chang would try expand this base. Under the June 6 
Law Concerning Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction, the head of the 
cabinet was granted the power to appoint cabinet members with the approval of the 
SCNR.210 This position was held by Chang until his resignation on July 3rd, after 
pressure from the colonels group became impossible to contain. It is possible that the 
exclusion of the colonels was Chang's power play, as “some government leaders privately 
had charged that General Chang manipulated the prevalent factionalism in running the 
government and sought to put his followers into key posts.”211 
Chang resigned from all of his posts on July 3rd, likely forced out by the colonels 
faction in the junta—the primary agitators of the revolution whom Chang had excluded 
from power once it had succeeded. Thus, it is incorrect to assign Chang's ouster directly 
to Park. As noted earlier, it appears that Park was separate from the colonels group, not a 
part of it, despite his association with Kim Jong-Pil. An intelligence estimate released on 
July 18th noted,  
The potential division which is most apparent at present lies in the differences 
between the general officers and the field grade officers. There is a group of 10 or 
12 members of the junta—most of them colonels—who provided much of the 
coup’s initial impetus and planning and who probably differ with Park on junta 
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policies.”212  
 
There is strong evidence showing that Park was not, in fact, associated with Kim Jong-
Pil’s colonel faction, as is often asserted in the general narrative of the coup. Suffice it to 
say that Park’s involvement in the ouster of his trusted mentor is unlikely. For one thing, 
the same report noted “the removal of [Chang] eliminated the most likely member of the 
coup group around whom anti-junta military elements might have gathered. Chang’s 
departure, however, did little to resolve the basic problem of control within the coup 
group.”213  
The purge of Chang and his supporters did little to soften factionalism in the junta, 
since his was the weakest and smallest faction. In fact, it increased tensions between the 
remaining two, to the point of posing a real threat to the junta and its revolution. As noted, 
Chang was seen as the most likely candidate to pursue counter-revolutionary actions; this 
is exactly what his former colleagues accused. On July 9th, it was announced that Chang 
was arrested for just such counter-revolutionary activities.214 For this he received a death 
sentence. This action is explained by most scholars as a disingenuous attempt by Park to 
fully eliminate a political rival, which is certainly plausible but not well evidenced. For 
example, Yong-Sup Han argued  
The purge started with Chang [Do-Young] on July 3. Park had used Chang as a 
protective shield during the early days of the junta to buy time, to prevent both 
South Koreans and the U.S. Government from probing into Park's past leftist 
activities, and to claim that the entire military establishment was behind the coup. 
Park, who had survived several difficult moments during his lifetime, knew not 
only how to win the trust of others but also when to betray them to consolidate his 
power. With the United States moving to build close ties with him, he knew he 
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could purge Chang [Do-Young] without risking his leadership.215  
 
Here again Han holds that Park “used” Chang, and this entire passage assumes Park’s 
sole agency. As I have argued in this thesis, Park’s background does not indicate a skill 
for consolidating power, nor was the ouster of Chang in any way risk-free. The betrayal 
mentioned here by Han was when Park divulged the identities of Labor Party members in 
the military to keep himself from being executed. It was act of survival where he offered 
up a group he held little loyalty or affinity to in exchange for his own freedom; it did 
nothing to “consolidate his power.” And for Park, his military career always seemed to 
override any political concerns. Moreover, Chang’s removal did in fact pose a significant 
threat to the junta in the several ways previously noted.  
Another problematic example is a suggestion by Hyung-A Kim:  
On July 3, Chang was arrested on the charge of conspiring to carry out a 
countercoup, along with a mixed group of forty-four generals, colonels, and other 
officers. The purge of Chang, generally seen as a power struggle between the 
Southern factions, which included primarily the provinces of Kyongsang and 
Ch'ungch'ong, and the Northern faction, mostly from P'yongan province, also led 
to the fall of the fifth graduating KMA class as a next-generation contender for 
the position of crown prince within the military junta against Kim [Jong-Pil] and 
his young colonels of the eighth KMA class.216  
 
Kim strongly implies that the 44 officers were all removed from their posts in relation 
with the Chang purge. This seems to be incorrect. It appears that three of the officers 
were removed from the supreme council for “loyalty” problems, but the remaining mass 
were general military “deadwood.”217 This passage also implies that Chang planned to be 
“crown prince” or heir to Park, rather than the chief power holder himself, which is a 
questionable claim given Chang’s character and background. The suggestions in the 
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primary record that Chang was putting his supporters into power seem to strongly 
discount such a “crown prince” argument. Kim also implies here that Park was behind the 
move suggesting, “Park made himself the undisputed leader of the junta.”218  This is 
another example of a commentator assigning too much agency to Park without clear 
evidence. 
Ultimately, the idea that the accusations could have been true rarely inspires a 
second thought. But at least some of them were likely true, to some extent. First, Chang 
was convicted in a public trial, noted by the UN Commission in Korea. In its report, the 
UN Commission stated they “had every opportunity and co-operation from government 
authorities in making its observations, both in the capital and in the country-side. Within 
its mandate the Commission [had] observed political developments that have taken 
place.”219 It would have been very difficult for the junta to put on a kangaroo court in 
public, without the UN, the CIA, or the foreign media suspecting anything. Certainly 
there could have been political aspects to the arrest and trial, but historians should not 
simply dismiss the whole case as Park’s power play without specific primary evidence. 
Any such evidence is absent in the general scholarship.  
As this section has detailed, Chang Do-Young was an apt political leader who 
clearly intended to stay in power. He hedged his loyalty with Chang Myon and his 
support of the coup until the last moment, siding with the clear winner, and gaining the 
most powerful position in the process. Then, while leading the junta, he attempted to 
create a power base that would keep himself there. As the former Army Chief of Staff, he 
had the reputation and means to attempt a successful counter-coup even though it would 
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likely have been against Kim Jong-Pil and the radical colonels who had ousted him. Park 
Chung-Hee, who originally revealed the coup plans to Chang and asked him to join the 
revolution, is a far less likely target. Moreover, Park gave Chang a full pardon a year 
later.220 The colonels were the radical faction and it is far more probable that Chang's 
removal had been their power play.221 With Chang gone, Park Chung-Hee became the 
moderating force in the junta, and increasingly opposed to the colonels who had started 
the revolution.222 
 
Park and Kim Jong-Pil 
 
 
 
Another relationship that deserves a fresh look is that of Park and Kim Jong-Pil. 
This is especially relevant because recent interviews with Kim have questioned the 
general narrative of the coup. Between these two men was a complex dynamic of power 
wielding that controlled the fate of the junta. It should be repeated that Kim was a 
political radical whom UN Forces Commander Macgruder had sought for as long as a 
year to remove.223 This is in contrast to Park, who was seen as the “coolest head and most 
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reliable and stable leaders.”224 Kim is regularly described in literature in one manner or 
another as Park’s “henchman,” suggesting complete control by Park and no significant 
agency of his own.225 His familial relationship to Park, being Park’s nephew-in-law, is 
often cited as evidence of Park’s influence over Kim. It is possible, though, that this 
familial relationship was Kim’s means for approaching Park. As already noted, Kim 
Jong-Pil stated in new interviews that he was the architect of the coup and that he had 
asked Park to join the coup, rather than vice versa. 
In addition to being one of the coup planners, if not its chief, Kim Jong-Pil 
certainly held significant power within the junta. Contemporary documents often describe 
him as the second most powerful man in the junta, under Park.226 Far from being a 
henchman, he determined policies and initiated actions on his own. One incident 
indicative of Kim's greater power in the early junta than Park’s was the negotiations 
between the junta and General Magruder, over the return of command and control of the 
units that participated in the coup back under UN Command. Disagreement dogged the 
process. At first, the junta simply ignored Magruder's demand to return the displaced 
units to their assigned positions. Eventually Park, (acting only as vice-chairman of the 
ruling revolutionary committee) met with Magruder and reached a formal agreement with 
him on May 24th, more than a week after the coup. But it was rejected by the junta 
council.227 When the SNCR rejected Park’s proposal to UN Command, Magruder implied 
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that Kim Jong-Pil could “use his influence to seek reconsideration of the disapproval.”228 
And indeed, while Park’s agreement with Magruder was rejected by the junta, they 
accepted a later agreement secured by Kim Jong-Pil. This second agreement was finally 
passed two days later, after Magruder was forced negotiate with Kim.229 This contradicts 
the conventional idea that Park was de facto head of the junta and fully in power from the 
very beginning. 
Kim influenced policies in many other ways. Evidence indicates that many of the 
early junta's policies and actions seem to have stemmed from Kim’s ideas and 
prerogative. Park and his peers had strongly voiced their opinion about business 
corruption in the past and the junta took action almost as soon as it came to power. 
However, when the junta began arresting key businessmen for corruption, Kim resisted. 
“I didn’t like the idea of blaming these businessmen for corruption because we needed to 
mobilize them to launch a strong economic drive for growth" he explained in one of the 
new interviews, "We needed their cooperation.”230 Park’s idealistic tendency was to 
attack corruption in whatever context.231 Kim Jong-Pil was a realist who saw the 
necessity of pardoning some corrupt officials and businessmen in order to achieve the 
junta’s primary goals: economic development. Additionally, Kim claimed that the 
National Planning Committee for Reconstruction was founded on his “idea that we first 
need to drive hunger from Korea and spark an economic boom so that principles of 
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democracy could be set in place afterwards based on prosperity.” Kim further stated that 
he “had premediated long before the May 16 revolutions to set up a new set of rules that 
could bring major changes to every sector of society. I had a clear vision for post-
revolution Korea.”232 
Kim took the initiative with several other policies. Kim founded the Korean 
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) modeled on its U.S. counterpart—he recruited many 
of the first key members, created its motto, and decided that the agency should have 
investigative authority. Only after putting it all together, did he brief Park on what he had 
done. Park simply replied that he “was satisfied.”233 The agency is now infamous for its 
rough tactics against the public, including arrests without due process and violent 
interrogations. Evidence suggests that the KCIA’s tactics were the result of Kim’s 
leadership, outside of Park’s control. For instance, a telegram from the embassy in Korea 
stated:  
Further source of danger to stability of government . . . arises from activities of 
Kim Jong-Pil and ROKCIA. . . . Practice of midnight arrest and reports of strong-
arm methods to extract confessions still occur with sufficient frequency to 
maintain atmosphere of insecurity and fear. . . . Park and Supreme Council have 
taken steps to deal with this fear. . . . Park is aware that Kim Jong-Pil is capable of 
excesses arising from his exuberance for power and his inexperience.234 
 
The implication here is that the excesses of the KCIA were Kim’s doing, against Park’s 
desires, and that Park wanted to contain him. Kim's own recollection supports such an 
assertion. “I thought there had to be at least one government institution that should be 
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feared by the public,” Kim confessed in recent interviews.235 Using his power as the head 
of the KCIA, Kim also took it upon himself to launch secret negotiations with the 
Japanese, pushing for a meeting with Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda. Political negotiations 
with Japan had become stalled in previous governments due to public anger. Kim only 
briefed Park about his moves when he “was in the final phase of reaching a deal.”236 
Another potential flaw in extant scholarship is the repeated idea that Park Chung-
Hee and Kim Jong-Pil were members of a shared faction.237 However as has been 
mentioned in previous sections, U.S. Government sources suggest that Park was not a 
member of any faction.238 Moreover, there were strong suggestions of a split between 
Park and the colonels faction under Kim. Regarding the colonels faction relationship with 
Park, a U.S. government report stated, “There is a group of some 10 or 12 members of 
the junta—most of them Colonels—who provided much of the coup’s initial impetus and 
planning and who probably differ with Park on junta policies. In general, these officers 
tend to favor drastic measures to achieve their objectives and to suppress opposition. Park 
has indicated he intends to curb [their] influence.”239 Another report, questioned Kim’s 
support of Park, suggesting  
Lt. Col. Kim Jong-Pil is a leader of the impatient reform-minded younger element. 
As the head of the recently formed central intelligence agency, Kim has been 
moving to consolidate in police-state fashion all security affairs under his and 
presumably Park’s control. However, his loyalty to Park is uncertain. Inasmuch as 
some of Park’s strongest support has come from the younger officer group, an 
attempt to reduce their power could precipitate a bitter and possibly violent power 
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struggle within the junta.240 
 
The idea that Kim could turn against Park is present in other primary records, such as a 
CIA intelligence estimate that stated Kim “could become a rival [of Park’s] . . . Park may 
be sufficiently adroit to accomplish [curbing the influence of the faction] without causing 
the colonels to turn against him. . . . [though if] such a break occurred, the outcome 
would depend on whether Kim chose to support Park” or the colonels.241  
Despite the common argument in the literature that Park manipulated factions to 
establish his own power,242 the primary record seems to suggest that Kim Jong-Pil was 
the key agitator. In a telegram from the embassy in Korea, it was suggested that  
There is evidence traditional propensity for factionalism is asserting itself inside 
the Supreme Council. Most serious case occurred during September and first 
week of October when bitter internal power struggle [sic] was initiated by Kim 
Jong-Pil, Director ROKCIA, and some young colonels, aimed at purging generals 
from Hamgyong province. But there is also evidence that Chairman Park and 
others are determined to prevent this.243 
 
Being much more politically active and radical than Park, Kim Jong-Pil and his faction 
had previously used their power to curtail superiors. As early as May these men 
“weakened the authority of their own commanders by the organization of officers who 
are loyal to the coup group instead of their own commanders and who stay ready to act 
against their own commanders.”244 Kim and his faction had no qualms about directly 
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confronting their superiors. Their radicalism was a root cause of the factionalism in the 
junta, especially after Chang Do-Young and his supporters were removed, leaving only 
the fiery junior officers and the conservative generals. 
The factionalism got so severe that the U.S. Government and others warned of 
possible violence. A U.S. intelligence estimate stated,  
There will probably be efforts to compromise and settle differences, but if open 
conflict breaks out, we cannot exclude the possibility that the various faction 
leaders would call upon their supporters in the armed forces. This would in turn 
be likely to create an opening for action by ROK military commanders who 
disapprove of the junta. This could result in armed clashes and even civil war.245  
 
Contrary to claims in the literature that Park was considering violence to quell 
factionalism, here U.S. intelligence suggested that forces outside of Park’s control that 
were moving towards violence. In the view of Hyung-A Kim, “[t]he factional struggle 
was so serious that there was rampant speculation of an impending armed struggle among 
the military factions. Park contemplated the use of force to quell the division within his 
ranks.”246 The primary record contains no clear evidence of Park considering the use of 
military force to quell factionalism—at least none that this author can find. 
Moreover, it doesn’t fit the context. Since Park held little tactical command of any 
military units of his own, he could not have mobilized a military action against dissenters. 
It was the colonels who held such direct command over military forces, and as has been 
shown, their relationship with Park was rocky. Thus, the presupposition that Park was 
part of the colonels faction—and was the driving force of factionalism—has led to some 
questionable conclusions in the scholarship. Additionally, Park's widespread 
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revolutionary support stemmed from his reputation as the most moderate element in the 
junta. He could not attempt violence against ROK military elements without destroying 
the support of the junta, and support for himself, within the military. It was simply not an 
option for him. 
In 1964, Kim Jong-Pil was forced to retire from his political positions and go 
overseas. Many scholars suggest he was pushed out by Park, the latter being concerned 
about his own power. However, Kim claimed that he voluntarily retired in response to 
severe anti-Japan protests. At this point Kim was well known by the public as having led 
the renewed negotiations with Japan.247 “Sometimes those close to [Park] suggested that I 
be withdrawn from my position because of their struggle for power,” he recalled, “Park 
never relented. Even when I decided to go overseas in an effort to quell rising 
demonstrations against treaty negotiations in 1964, it was not as if he ordered me to leave 
the country as punishment.”248  
The power dynamic between Park and Kim deserves a serious second look. In the 
currently available scholarship even the most inclusive accounts still center on Park. One 
such example is a suggestion by Hyung-A Kim: 
The most critical part of this story was his complex relationship with Kim [Jong-
Pil], his right-hand man.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how Park could have so 
quickly taken control of the government and carried out fundamental 
administrative reforms had he not secured the support of Kim. Kim was widely 
regarded as a "co-owner" of the military coup of 1961. Founder and first director 
of the KCIA, he became the crown prince, wielding power rivaling that of Park. 
Once Park consolidated power with the help of Kim in the politics of purges by 
early 1963, however, Kim had to be brought down from the position of crown 
prince, not only in the interest of Park's further consolidation of power, but also 
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for the sake of the transition to a more technocratic growth strategy. Park reduced 
Kim's dominance when his role became the single most explosive threat to the 
stability of the SCNR and to Park's power.249 
 
Despite acknowledging Kim’s agency and role in the coup, Hyung-A Kim centers her 
narrative on Park, and the man’s ambition for sole power. She leaves Kim as little more 
than Park’s “right-hand man,” rather than an independent agent pursuing his own agenda. 
Much of this passage is refuted by Kim Jong-Pil himself. Kim claims to have been the 
architect of the coup, not simple a “co-owner” and especially not subordinate to Park. 
Also it was the idealistic and perhaps naïve Park who was a barrier to new growth 
strategies, not Kim; it was Kim who pushed for the pardon of key business leaders early 
on. Kim had always been an explosive threat to the junta’s stability, due to his radicalism 
and factionalist tendencies, long before he was removed as party leader in 1963. 
Moreover, Kim was brought back into the top levels of government only a few years later, 
even becoming prime minister in 1971, which seems to contradict the idea of him as a 
threat to Park. Kim’s power seems to have rivaled Park’s even before the coup was 
launched. Kim was capable of pushing his people to take strong political actions. There is 
little clear evidence showing Park could do the same.  While it is true that Kim did lose 
his positions of power in 1963 and was sent abroad, ultimately Hyung-A Kim fails to 
evidence specifically how Park was responsible for reducing Kim Jong-Pil’s role rather 
than other agents and forces. This is important in light of Kim Jong-Pil’s claims of 
support from Park at the time. Certainly Kim’s role in leading the coup and influencing 
the junta deserves further primary analysis. 
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Other Limits to Park’s Power and Agency 
 
 
 
In addition to conflicts with the agency of other actors such as Chang Do-Young 
and Kim Jong-Pil, there were many other ways in which Park’s power and agency were 
constrained during the junta period. As an individual, Park was noted as being a 
“moderating influence among the young enthusiasts who now lead the Republic,” a 
reference to the colonels faction.250 The same source, JFK’s briefing book for his meeting 
with Park in 1961, suggests that Park had “demonstrated considerable sophistication in 
political matters” but it also noted that many of the reform projects taken up by the junta 
were “talked about or were under consideration by previous administrations.”251 As is 
often noted in the literature, the junta borrowed many of its policies from previous 
regimes, a prime example being the first five-year plan. Despite their derivative nature, 
Park was accepting full responsibility for such projects by the end of the junta period. 
Writing in one of his first published books about the first five-year plan, Park promised 
that “whatever difficulties and whatever problems I may encounter, I will overcome them 
and march to success. I believe so, because it is my supreme responsibility as the person 
responsible for this project.”252 But we are left to question just how much individual 
power Park had at this time, and just how much his individual agency affected matters, as 
there were several limiting factors.  
The first of these liming factors was general factionalism. A U.S. Government 
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national intelligence estimate in May 1961, suggested that “[u]nless Park and his 
colleagues can generate and enforce a greater unity than appears likely, ROK politics will 
probably follow a pattern of constant factional maneuvering and periodic shifts in power 
within the ruling military group.”253 
While each of the junta's three major factions centered on a leading personality, the 
colonels who rallied behind Lieutenant Colonel Kim Jong-Pil—the initiators of the 
revolution—probably had the strongest personal attachment to its ideals. The second 
faction—the higher ranking generals arrayed behind Brigadier General Kim Yun-Kun—
were more conservative and resistant to the fundamental change advocated by the 
younger colonels. Lieutenant General Chang Do-Young, the former Army Chief of Staff 
under Chang Myon, led the smallest faction—a handful of generals who joined the 
revolution at the last moments in order to keep at least some of their former influence.254     
Until now, scholars have placed Park within the colonels’ camp, even though CIA 
analysis during the coup did not see Park was not a member of any specific faction.255 
With the ouster of Chang Do-Young and his faction mere months after the coup, the 
intramural revolutionary struggles became more of a two way contest between the 
conservative generals and radical colonels, the latter pushing for more significant changes 
in the political and military systems. Some scholars posit that the most significant issue in 
determining factions was regional origin, but U.S. intelligence noted in July 1961, that 
the division “which is most apparent at present lies in the difference between the general 
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officers and the field grade officers.”256 Though regionalism was certainly a reality in 
Korea at this time, and a long-standing one, ideology seems to have been a bigger factor. 
The generals who had gained their rank through the old system were hesitant to change 
the status quo, whereas the colonels were primarily concerned with corruption in the 
higher ranks and the retention of incompetent senior officers who blocked their 
promotions and stifled their careers. The colonels desired to be an active force in 
reshaping the country; they were idealists, and the generals were a barrier to their goals. 
Regional loyalties or military academy class bonds were peripheral issues, military class 
peerage being more of a coincidence tied to time in service, which ultimately determined 
rank. Officers of the same rank were simply more likely to have been in the same 
graduating class. Certainly the networking and bonds of loyalty between class peers are 
worth noting, but it is risky to weight them more. Common backgrounds put peers in 
similar situations which helped lead them to the same ideologies. Ideology seems to have 
been the major point of fracture. 
 In addition to political differences between the generals and colonels, a major 
point of friction between these groups was the dissatisfaction amongst the coup's younger 
officers, who did much of the planning and most of the execution only to be 
“subsequently denied cabinet posts in favor of general officers who joined the revolt 
belatedly.”257 As such, the colonels became more adamant about securing power for 
themselves, in order to further radicalize the political agenda of the junta. The colonels, 
who supported Park and lifted him into the seat of power, had become such a problem 
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that Park had to “curb their influence.”258 
Factionalism was a real problem both for Park and the junta in general. 
Ambassador Berger noted in letter to U.S. Secretary of State Rusk in December, 1961 
that factionalism “remains a latent threat to the stability of the [ROK] government.” He 
also suggested that "factionalism has been kept under control up to now is due largely to 
Park’s determination to fight those of his colleagues who are so motivated.”259 Losing 
factions posed a significant security threat in many ways. A memorandum from Robert H. 
Johnson of the U.S. National Security Council Staff in June suggested that “there was 
some possible danger, as a result of a power struggle within the SCNR, that a group 
losing out might attempt a unification maneuver in cooperation with the North as a means 
of salvaging its position.”260 This danger materialized in the form of counter-coups and 
assassination attempts on Park. One that has already been noted is the arrest of Chang 
Do-Young and three other officers for such behavior.261 Ambassador Berger alluded to 
this danger in December, when he suggested Park would need to “escape an assassin’s 
bullet.”262 Another assassination plot was confirmed in December, 1963. The plan, which 
was to attack Park during his first presidential inauguration, was “uncovered by the ROK 
CIA which [held] a recording of a conversation between two individuals in which the 
planned assassination was discussed.”263 
 Factionalism continued to be a significant problem through the end of the junta 
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period, as evidenced by the split in the new Democratic Republican Party between Kim 
Jong-Pil and Lieutenant General Kim Dong-Ha. The latter had “participated in the 
preparatory planning for the party” and resigned from both the DRP and SCNR in 
opposition to Kim Jong-Pil’s party leadership.264  
Appointing or removing other leaders or representatives was as problematic as 
factionalism, and another limitation of Park’s power and agency. There are arguments in 
the common literature that Park enjoyed full control and that he was able to purge 
whomever defied him. For example, Yong-Sup Han argues that shortly after the coup, 
“[t]he SCNR announced the appointment of General Kim Chong-O as the new army 
chief of staff and former army chief of staff Song [Yo-Chan] as the defense minister. 
These appointments were made by Park and his followers and not by Chang [Do-Young], 
who was rapidly reduced to a figurehead.”265 Here Han ignores details of Chang’s moves 
to put his people in power, and also the formal rules of the junta which gave the chairman, 
Chang, power of appointment. If Han did have evidence that disputed such details, he 
should have provided it. However, as is common in Han’s essay, the author provides no 
citations or evidence to support his claims. Similarly, passages asserting Park's ultimate 
responsibility for the behavior and actions of individual appointees lack primary source 
support. 
One basic example was the sudden recall of Yoo Yang-Soo (Yu Yang-Su), who 
had been sent the United States on a goodwill mission in July 1961. It was suggested that 
his recall was related to either comments Yoo made about Rhee Syngman being allowed 
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to return to Korea266 or a “remark concerning maladministration of U.S. aid in [the] 
ROK.”267 The U.S. Foreign Office suggested that “Yoo’s removal is a part of power 
struggle in [the] ROK and [it] considers significant that Yoo was the last representative of 
the Pyongan faction.”268 The same telegram questioned “Park’s failure to send 
representative to the U.S. who enjoys his full trust.”269 However, in the month before his 
recall, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul described Yoo as an “influential advisor and confidant” 
of Park and “an able and moderate thinking General,” the same as Park.270 It seems that 
Yoo was an ally of Park, perhaps even appointed to his position by Park, and that his 
recall was forced by other members of the junta contrary to Park’s wishes. This also is 
supported by the fact that Yoo joined Park shortly after this incident, during Park’s visit 
to the United States to meet with President Kennedy.271 
Referenced previously, the rise of Lieutenant General Song Yo-Chan also sheds 
light on the limits of Park’s agency and power in emplacing or removing junta leaders. 
Song was the Army Chief of Staff during the end of the Rhee Administration and a target 
of both Park and Kim Jong-Pil for corruption. Given that animosity, one wonders why 
Park would allow Song to become a major leader in the SCNR. The most probable 
answer is that he didn’t. It is likely that Song became Defense Minister in June of 1961, 
and Prime Minister in August of the same year, in spite of his relationship with Park 
rather than because of it. The clash between Song and Park continued throughout the 
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junta period. As Prime Minister in 1961, Song tried to force the Supreme Council to 
discharge only “legislative functions and leave executive functions to the cabinet”—a 
direct assault on Park’s supposed power as chairman, as was Song’s determination to 
“stop ministers from by-passing the cabinet.”272 At the same time Song was described as 
“tainted by service during the Rhee regime, and is suspected of harboring personal 
political ambitions.”273 In June of 1962, Song and his entire cabinet resigned “to protest 
General Park’s financial policies.”274 Mutual distrust came to a head when Song was 
arrested in August of 1962, charged with wrongfully “ordering the summary execution 
during the Korean war in 1950 of a Korean officer on the ground that he deserted his 
post.” The additional accusation that “when he was Army Chief of Staff, he was 
reportedly suspected of ordering troops to fire on student demonstrators during the 1960 
April uprising” may be more significant, but either of these, if true, would have placed 
Song against Park.275 Rash military justice had almost brought about Park’s own 
execution, and Park’s writings show outspoken support for the student demonstrators of 
1960, as well as opposition to the government at that time. 
Further putting the men at odds, after his retirement as Prime Minister, Song had 
been “a critic of the military government” even issuing an open letter to that end, and 
opposed the possible extension of military rule.276 The idea that someone so antagonistic 
to Park could stay in power for more than a year and continue as an outspoken critic of 
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the junta is rarely, if at all, questioned in the current scholarship. This case seems to be 
proof that junta membership and positions were not decided solely by Park’s own hand, 
nor could Park simply wipe away any political rivals that caused him problems. Certainly 
in later years Park became much more capable of shaping the government as he wished. 
However, this evidence suggests that during the junta period, Park was still far from 
absolute power. 
One more incident that highlights the complexity of agency within the junta and 
the competing factions and agendas was the arrest of the junta’s own corruption 
investigation task force. The 15 officer team was arrested for “accepting bribes from 
Korean business men charged with having accumulated illegal fortunes during previous 
regimes,” namely the people they were supposed to go after.277 Some of these men were 
close to junta leaders, and one in particular, Colonel Lee Chung-Soon (I Cheong-Sun), 
the chief of the team, had received a commendation from Park himself.278 The 
investigation against the team was pushed by Kim Jong-Pil and his KCIA, and was 
suggested to be part of the factional struggles between Kim’s colonels faction and the 
generals faction, in this case Major General Lee Joo-Il (I Ju-Il). The latter was the former 
head of the SCNR’s “subcommittee on punishment for corruption, under which the 
arrested investigation team operated.”279 Lee Joo-Il would later be promoted to 
Lieutenant General, made vice-chairman of the SCNR, and tapped to head the junta’s 
Constitutional Study Committee. Thus, it appears the accusations made against Lee may 
have been false. If so, this incident shows the limits of Park’s power, as this event seems 
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to have spiraled well out of Park’s control.  
Despite Park’s position as chairman of the SCNR and head of the junta, 
factionalism flared out far beyond his ability to control and significant decisions were 
made contrary to his apparent goals. Appointees often caved in to external pressures 
despite Park’s support, and simultaneously remained under threat from rival factions 
within the SCNR. Park was far from the omnipotent and all-powerful ruler that the 
mythology would suggest, at least in the early 1960s. 
 
Did Park plan to stay in power? 
 
 
 
Another flawed presupposition on which writers of the junta period rely is the 
idea that Park wanted, or rather planned, to stay in power.  In Hyung-A Kim's account of 
the 1963 presidential election, “Park believed he was ready to pursue his ultimate goal of 
becoming the president.”280 Kim offers neither citations, nor evidence to prove what Park 
“believed” or what his “ultimate goal” was.  Indeed it is quite common to read statements 
about what Park thought or believed that have no supporting evidence. While we can 
make assumptions about beliefs based on behavior, these fall well short of certainty. That 
Park eventually became president is not absolute proof of his determination to get there, 
especially in light of the many other agents who benefitted from his staying in power. 
And the primary record does suggest that Park did not plan—or even desire—to stay in 
power, and would not have, except for circumstances and the agency of others.281  
Consider how Park became prime minister during the junta. When Song Yo-Chan 
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resigned as Prime Minister, in 1962, Park eventually took his place. This is generally 
viewed as a power grab by Park. However, contemporary reports noted that “General 
Park at first had selected Kim Hyun-Chul (Gim Hyeon-Cheol) as acting Premier.” It was 
Colonel Oh Chi-Sung (O Chi-Seong), chairman of the junta’s steering and planning 
committee who “proposed General Park as Premier” suggesting that Park take over the 
position temporarily to prevent a power vacuum.282 Here we can clearly see Park being 
used as a pillar of support for an inherently fractious ruling coalition; anyone who had a 
vested interest in the stability of the junta benefitted from Park’s promotion. 
Less significantly, there are also the pledges of Park and the junta to return to 
civilian government. Such a return was promised almost as soon as the junta took power. 
Chairman of the junta’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees, Yoo Sang-Yoo, 
reiterated this pledge to U.S. Secretary of State Rusk in July of 1961.283 The plan for 
returning to civilian rule was publicly announced in August of 1961, setting a timetable 
to elections in May of 1963.284 In December of 1962, a national referendum was 
conducted to approve a new constitution developed by the junta. A report from the 
United Nations Commission for the Unification Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) 
noted that 85.3% of registered voters cast ballots and the referendum was passed with 
78.8% in favor. The same report noted “developments and the preparations for the return 
to civilian representative government.”285 The junta was moving towards civilian rule, 
not only in words but in actions as well. 
One detail that scholars have cited as evidence of Park’s hidden plans to keep 
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power was the formation of the Democratic Republican Party. As early as September of 
1961, the CIA had concluded that the junta might form its own political party. A national 
intelligence estimate stated the junta may attempt to “guarantee its control through such 
means as forming its own political party and running military or ex-military officers for 
political office.”286 However, at this point there was no indication of Park's involvement, 
let alone any intention take up the mantle of party leadership. Kim Jong-Pil was 
responsible for creating the party in 1962, utilizing his resources as KCIA director to do 
so. There were hints of the party system being used as an authoritarian tool, and I have 
already argued that Kim was the likely impetus of authoritarianism in the junta. However, 
since current scholarship generally recognizes Kim as Park’s lackey, the leap to the idea 
that Park was fully responsible is quite easy. For example, Hyung-A Kim suggests that 
“everyone thought that Park knew of Kim's activities from the very beginning and was 
wholly supportive of the DRP project.”287   However, Kim does not actually explain who 
this “everyone” was or how she could be certain what they all thought. Kim Jong-Pil 
stated in recent interviews that his own subordinates had presented the idea for forming a 
party to him in August of 1961 in order to “prevent an old political group from seizing 
power.”288 Kim specifically stated that Park thought it was too early to form a party. Park 
did not attend a party meeting until a year later and even at that time simply wished them 
“good luck.”289  
Regardless of Park’s specific involvement with the formation of the DRP, the 
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fundamental critique of this event by current scholarship is flawed. The general sentiment 
is that it was a distinctly illegal act, given the junta’s prohibitions on political activity 
before 1963, and one designed specifically to help Park win the inevitable election. 
Hyung-A Kim evokes this sentiment when she states that “the organization of the DRP 
meant that Park got a head start on preparations for the upcoming electoral contest.”290 
Not only does this imply that the idea of Park running for president had already been 
established at that time, which the primary record refutes, but it also emphasizes a “head 
start” for the DRP which is not so readily apparent. Such arguments proceed from the 
assumption that the junta was actively preventing other groups from organizing behind 
the scenes. However, U.S. government documents show that, despite the ban, politicians 
were “meeting more or less secretly to plan their tactics and strategy.”291 While it was 
certainly true that opposition groups could not hold public rallies due to the prohibition 
on political activities, the DRP was under the same restriction. It is possible that the 
advantage of the DRP’s early formation has been overstated. Certainly the party’s early 
formation was intended to give the junta’s party an advantage, but it is hard to estimate 
how much it actually achieved in light of other politicians also being able to meet in 
secret. It was not as one-sided as the common narrative suggests. 
Another incident which scholars have used to allege Park’s lust for power is the 
1963 discussion about extending military rule. In March, Park informed Ambassador 
Berger of a plan to hold a referendum to extend military rule by four years.292 However 
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the circumstances that led to this event are not entirely clear. Two days later Michael V. 
Forrestal of the U.S. National Security Council Staff suggested two possible explanations 
for this. He stated “Two opposite views are conceivable: 1) that Park never intended to 
bow out of politics . . . or 2) that Park would like to carry through on his pledge, but is 
being used by Kim Jong-Pil’s followers to promote their own cause.”293  
While the current Park scholarship usually argues the former case, there is 
significant primary evidence suggesting the latter case was more accurate. First, there 
were several early indications that Park was against long-term military rule. As early as 
May of 1961, Park was quoted as saying that even five years of military rule might lead 
to “adverse effects.”294 In August of that year, Park indicated that he would welcome help 
from the United States in promoting the return to civilian rule in the form of a private 
statement of support.295 In November, it was being reported that “[t]here [were] 
Americans in Seoul who [were] convinced that General Park particularly want[ed] to see 
military authoritarianism ended and [was] aware of the self-perpetuating danger of junta 
rule.”296 In July of 1962, a telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to Secretary of State 
Rusk stated that Park had  
declared that the people should choose a president from among politicians who 
were well acquainted with politics. Military men, he added, might temporarily be 
needed in time of crisis, but once normal conditions were achieved and order 
restored, it would not be advantageous to the nation for “men like us” to go into 
politics.297 
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 For his part, Park claimed a desire to “hand over power to fresh and conscientious 
politicians and return to my original duty of defending the country after completing the 
objectives of the revolution. . . . Our genuine determination was to go back to our posts 
when the crisis confronting the nation had been eliminated.”298 Park made many such 
claims in his writing. “I wanted to hold on to democratic principles, although making a 
revolution,” he wrote, “because I thought I could not possibly kill the democracy which 
our people had won for the first time in 5,000 years.”299 Such a convergence of evidence 
from various sources should certainly be considered. 
The more likely explanation is that other members of the junta were pushing for 
this, rather than Park—particularly Kim Jong-Pil and his followers—as was suggested by 
Forrestal. As early as August of 1961, “the Embassy reported that it had indications that 
the younger members of the SCNR, Prime Minister Song, and KCIA Director Kim Jong-
Pil were resisting the idea of relinquishing military rule during the next 2 years.”300 Kim 
confirmed this idea in recent interviews when he stated that it was Park who suggested 
adding the clause about the return to civilian rule in the original coup declaration. Kim’s 
response to this suggestion was wholly negative. He stated, 
I thought once we succeeded in our plan there would be no way back but only 
forward—with us governing. . . . For many reasons, I did not like Park’s idea. But 
Park was insistent with his rather naïve idea. He wanted to convince me that he 
wasn’t overthrowing the government out of his greed for power but from a desire 
for a better country. . . . But I thought to myself that the clause would have no 
effect in reality.301 
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Kim Jong-Pil was adamant about the revolutionaries keeping power, with Park in the lead. 
As early as June of 1961, U.S. Government documents “expressed concern over the 
growing power of Lieutenant Colonel Kim Jong-Pil who, [they] feared, might be setting 
the state for ruthless one-man rule.”302 The document does not make clear at the time 
whose rule this would be, nor does it connect the idea directly to Park. The important 
point of consideration here is that it was Kim pushing for continued authoritarian rule. 
By 1963, there was significant conflict in the ruling collective: “unrest among the 
armed services” and even demonstrations by military officers demanding an extension of 
military rule.303 There was also an alleged counter-coup attempt against the military 
government, as noted previously. The KCIA arrested nineteen people on such charges, 
giving Park little choice. Rather than an attempt to maintain power for himself, the idea 
of having a public referendum on extending military rule may have been a plan to force 
the military hardliners’ hand. If the people voted publicly against extended military rule, 
which the circumstances of protest and opposition suggested would almost certainly 
happen, then the military would have no choice but to acquiesce or face significant 
domestic and international backlash. Ultimately, Park was able to appease both sides with 
a compromise that protected the military rulers from reprisals by a new government. “In 
return for assurances of no retaliation against members of the junta and revolutionary 
government officials,” Park promised that “he would abstain from political activity.”304 
Which leads to the last major factor in the argument that Park planned all along to 
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stay in power: his eventual run for president as the DRP’s candidate. Kim Jong-Pil 
wanted Park to run for president and had setup the DRP for that very reason. The party 
intended to formally nominate Park as its candidate at its convention on February 25, 
1963.305 However, on February 7th, Park told Kim Jong-Pil that he would not run.306 
Under pressure from the military chiefs of staff for Park to return to the military, Park 
made the February 18 public announcement he would not run. In addition, Park’s 
proposed candidacy and Kim Jong-Pil’s power in the party had caused a split, when Kim 
Dong-Ha quit the party.307 In April, Park called for a merger of the DRP and the Liberal 
Democratic Party to form a “pan-national” party, which he hoped would appeal to several 
groups.308 Park seems to have been struggling to find a method to keep his revolution 
moving through the election. It wasn’t until May 27th that Park formally accepted the 
DRP party nomination. It took a long time, through a series of backs-and-forths, to get to 
that point. It seems that Park’s candidacy was the only method of appeasing the military 
hardliners and keeping the DRP together. 
Ultimately, what the scholarship fails to recognize about Park’s run for president 
is that he was not one man running for himself, but rather that he represented a collective 
and a political movement. Like any group seeking power in a democratic system, the 
DRP had to choose the representative that had the greatest chance of winning. This was 
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especially significant since they were facing a well-known figure at the head of their 
opposition, the former President Yun Bo-Sun. Park had been the public face for the junta, 
and the people had strong feelings about him. Moreover, factional struggles and public 
backlash had pushed the most viable secondary choice, Kim Jong-Pil, out of the party and 
even the country. Likely no other member of the DRP would have had a chance in a race 
against Yun, the closeness of the actual vote between Yun and Park attests to this. 
Certainly Park wanted to keep his group in power, to keep moving forward with their 
revolutionary agenda. That is not in question. What is questioned here is the idea that 
Park always wanted to be the leader of this movement and was determined to use all his 
power to stay there. For this, the primary record is not clear. There is substantial evidence 
that Park was ready to step aside but the potential collapse of his party forced him back. 
Park was a moderating influence that kept his ruling collective and its followers together. 
Lee Joo-Il and Kim Dong-Ha’s splits from the party show just how fragile the group’s 
cohesion was. C.I Eugene Kim, writing at the time, suggested,  
Park and Kim [Jong-Pil] needed each other; Park was important because of his 
seniority in the army and his moderating role within the junta, and Kim was 
essential because of his dynamic leadership. Now, both of them, for the moment 
at least, were gone, but Kim's party organization was kept more or less intact 
under titular leadership. There was a strong implication that in due course, the 
party would press Park to take the leadership and run for the presidency. The 
discovery on March 11 of an attempted coup against the junta government . . . 
helped convince Park that he would have to reverse his decision to retire from 
politics.309 
 
In the end, it was indeed Park’s choice to become his party’s candidate. But this was not 
really a choice at all. For the DRP, there was no choice but Park Chung-Hee. So they 
“pressed” him into service.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Han Sung-Jo (Han Seong-Jo) declared in 1999, “We cannot overemphasize that it 
was Park Chung-Hee who forged the necessary conditions and motivations for [the 
transformation of Korea].”310 Can we not? Indeed we can, as I have demonstrated. This is 
especially so when dealing with the early period, which includes the coup and the junta. 
The certainty applied to some analyses of Park’s ideology and agency is at a minimum 
questionable, if not severely flawed. An unwillingness to question much of the 
conventional narrative has prevailed over the past fifty years, as evidenced by an 
overreliance on the secondary record. Rather than repeat the mistake, I have returned to 
the primary sources and re-analyzed Park’s role in the events during the coup and junta 
period of 1960-1963. The evidence cited herein has shown that conventional narrative 
cannot be taken at face value; that to do so would be to confuse history with mythology. 
Be they politically slanted or neutral, most extant narratives have not taken a thorough 
and objective look at Park’s agency. In fact, Park’s role and power during this early 
period has been exaggerated. 
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Moving Forward 
 
 
 
As I have argued, a thorough review of the “Park era” based on primary research 
is important today, especially if one considers the current political and social 
circumstances in South Korea. Park Chung-Hee’s daughter is the sitting president and she 
has been increasingly compared with her father’s perceived negative attributes. Moreover, 
every government and president that has followed Park has faced scandal and accusations 
of corruption. The details can be found in various reports by Freedom House, which 
describes itself as “an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of 
freedom and democracy around the world.”311 Amongst other things, the group shows 
that the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun (No Mu-Hyeon) regimes 
all faced bribery or graft scandals. Their reports also note police torture accusations in 
2010, and the “meddling in political affairs” and bribery charges against National 
Intelligence Service (successor to the KCIA) members in 2013 and 2014. The corruption 
that plagued the past is still occurring today. In 2011, a member of parliament set off a 
tear gas grenade in the house in opposition to the majority party, a sign of the still present 
factionalism that has continuously crippled governments here. The problems of Korean 
politics that Park supposed his revolution would fix are still very much alive and 
prominent, all of which shows that the “Park era” was not so long ago.  
Mythology still pervades Park historiography even though Park Chung-Hee was 
certainly no Fidel Castro, Mao Zedong, or even Kim Il-Sung. Before coming to power, 
Park was neither an established revolutionary leader with years of experience and support, 
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nor a shining personality that could draw scores under his shadow. He was relatively 
unknown and unimpressive; liked and respected by some, but hated by others. An almost 
fatal dearth of good officers during the Korean War fast-tracked his career—during three 
years of war, he rose from major to brigadier general—but others were equally fortunate. 
Park’s successes at school, in the military academies, and on active duty demonstrate his 
competence as an officer and scholar but little more.  
Indeed, little in this period of Park’s life suggests that he was extraordinary. We 
do know that after consolidating power, and learning from some initial mistakes, he was 
surprisingly successful. But scholars seem to have retroactively applied that later success 
to his early career without clear cause. The strong leadership Park demonstrated in later 
years is not as apparent during the coup and junta period.  It is perhaps taken for granted 
that if Park was a good leader in the later years, he must have been so during his whole 
career. But the man’s later success is not evidence of early ability. In fact, there are signs 
that his leadership in the early periods was relatively weak. The complex rivalries and 
factional politics of 1961-1963 hint at this, although we do not have enough primary 
evidence to make a clear judgment in either direction. But that gap has not stopped 
scholars and popular writers from advancing assumptions about Park’s skill of 
manipulation and lust for rule. To the contrary, it seems to have encouraged such 
recklessness; a writing of mythology rather than history based on fact. With the analytical 
scrutiny of previously underused—and ignored—primary sources cited in this work 
comes a second chance. 
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